PBMAS Testimony Denise Pierce

Testimony of Denise Pierce before the Texas Education Agency regarding: Proposed amendments to the Performance-Based Mon...

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Testimony of Denise Pierce before the Texas Education Agency regarding: Proposed amendments to the Performance-Based Monitoring Analysis System Friday, June 18, 2010 I. INTRODUCTION Good Morning. I’m Denise Pierce, the Vice President for Member Services at the Texas Charter Schools Association, TCSA. I am pleased to be representing David Dunn, the TCSA Executive Director. TCSA is the statewide membership organization promoting all types of effective charter schools, representing over 78,000 students in more than 390 charter schools. Thank you for your time today and listening to our ideas and concerns surrounding the proposed amendments to the Performance-Based Monitoring Analysis System. We recognize that the proposed rules are about the specific indicators and the manual, and as you are considering those indicators we want you to be mindful of the unintended consequences in the form of intervention activities that are directly related to the analysis of data. First of all, our association agrees with the Agency that the monitoring of special programs is required. It is also a smart idea and a good use of taxpayer dollars. School effectiveness and federal compliance must be determined – and the only way to do that is to keep close track of all public schools, both traditional and charter, so that kids do not fall through the cracks. To be sure, TCSA encourages productive and efficient public schools. Our aim here today is to provide input on improving our state’s compliance standards so that they better measure the productivity actually occurring in Texas public schools. It is clear that the future of the charter school movement depends on the ability of charter schools to deliver productive results in the form of well-educated students. Open-enrollment charter schools were founded with varying missions to address various student populations. The TCSA membership includes four openenrollment charter school mission types: (1) college preparatory; (2) drop-out prevention and recovery; (3) juvenile justice & residential treatment centers; and (4) specialized mission. For many open-enrollment charter schools that serve special populations under specially tailored programs, a one-size-fits-all PBMAS compliance system is unfair and unworkable. To make it work, we suggest the PBMAS system is adjusted to ensure that its measures match school mission. II. CONCERNS AEA CONSIDERATIONS Forty percent of charter schools are dedicated to educating students that have already dropped out of school, or are at risk of dropping out because of various, and often heartbreaking, reasons. These are the students Texas needs to serve the

most. These students need public education so that they do not fall further behind in society. Yet, here is the disconnect - Charter schools that were founded to assist atrisk students are getting penalized through PBMAS for serving that type of student. Our internal and member-based research shows that these charter schools that is, charters rated under alternative education accountability procedures, are disproportionally affected by PBMAS. This is likely because their charters are, as outlined in the state accountability manual, dedicated to serving a much higher percentage of students—75% or more, in fact—defined by statute as at-risk of dropping out of school. They arrive 2 or more years behind academically and already out of their cohort group. Starting behind their cohort group, they normally take more time to graduate. As currently configured, the PBMAS would penalize a charter school at which this student is enrolled: first for the student’s failure to pass the grade level TAKS, and next for the student’s failure to graduate with his or her cohort group. The TEA’s Accountability Manual has several chapters setting forth the standards to be applied in alternative education settings. No such consideration is afforded in the PBMAS systems for alternative education campuses. As is, the PBMAS system cannot accurately gauge three specific measures: (1.) the dropout rate; (2.) the 4-year longitudinal graduation rate; and (3.) the TAKS performance indicators. PBMAS standards often align with the standard state accountability standards; this results in the application of unreasonable standards to the alternative education charters. We urge TEA to start making considerations for AEA schools through PBMAS, as it does in the accountability system. If we could adjust the performance based monitoring system to ensure that the indicators and measurements accurately match the school’s designated mission and desire to continue to serve pre-identified students with special needs, we will simultaneously help regulators, administrators and lawmakers isolate real and profound problematic schools – therefore we could render prompt and practical solutions. Texas is truly in the midst of a dropout crisis. Part of the great thing about the charter movement is that they have enough flexibility in their missions to deliberately work with this population. Instead of penalizing and burdening this type of school for educating dropouts, we should strengthen them with every tool we’ve got.

SPECIAL EDUCATION CONSIDERATIONS Beyond charter schools that serve at-risk students, charters of all types commonly receive students who have been previously identified as requiring special education services. As open-enrollment public schools, charters accept all students, including those needing special services, and work to continue to provide those services for the student. In fact, with often smaller and more focused settings, some charters provide for these students so well that families of students enrolled often recommend their schools to friends and neighbors with similar needs. The “representation of Special Education” indicators currently measure the percentage of students being served, not the number of students identified. As a result, if a charter continues to provide services for students in need as they come in from other schools, they may be inappropriately sanctioned for “over identification” of students in these categories. ADVERSE EFFECTS In the field, our members are experiencing significant adverse effects on their schools once they enter a PBMAS intervention stage. The sanctions can result in the denials of federal and state grants, denials of requests for expanded programs and campuses, and damaging accreditation consequences. Today, you’ll hear from some of our member schools who will tell you more about their real world experiences with performance based monitoring. III. IDEAS/SOLUTIONS I wanted to come here today to articulate our concerns with the proposed PBM rules, but also offer some solutions and ideas to resolve these differences together. First, I think we should move away from using PBMAS as a stick and keep using it as a carrot for improvement. The schools should be monitored for performance, but ultimately should be incentivized to show continuous improvement. We couldn’t agree more that charter schools should never stop getting better. This is the premise of our Quality Framework plan that we’ve just launched at TCSA. Secondly, filters should be applied to AEA charters for Dropout Rate and 4year Graduation Rate Indicators. This would align with filters for RTC centers that are more likely to serve students with disabilities. Third, we think there should be reasonable actions once performance levels are assigned and intervention activities begin. Truthfully, if the PBMAS is adjusted as recommended earlier, with consideration for AEA charters and a true

measure for over identification of students for special programs, some of these concerns may be resolved. But if the adjustments do not take place within the data analysis system, changes to intervention strategies would release unnecessary burden. As you are aware, with each intervention stage additional activities are required of districts and charters, ranging from simple explanations of the data to highly detailed continuous improvement plans, public hearings, and on-site reviews. If performance levels of 1, 2, or 3 are assigned, the likelihood that more will be required increases. The concern is that some indicators, such as the overrepresentation or 4-year graduation rate for AEA charters mentioned above, are not likely to change from year-to-year for charters due to the reasons discussed earlier as well because charters are more likely to be affected due to skewed percentages as a result of small numbers. This means that a school will be performing some kind of corrective action activity, using the most valuable resource an educator has—time. Again, provisions for AEA charters that align with TEA-defined alternative education procedures would prevent that, but at a minimum, a district or charter should be able to state in a simpler way—regardless of performance level assigned—why the data demonstrates a certain way. In other words, if a charter is assigned a Performance Level of 3 on an indicator in which data is highly dependent on the mission of the school, there should be opportunity for a district or charter to “clear” that level with an earlier intervention stage activity that is consistent with a lower Performance Level. For example, an AEA charter should be able to state that a great number of their students entered already behind in grade level and are unlikely to graduate with their cohorts without having to complete a detailed analysis, a continuous improvement plan, hold a public hearing, or prepare for an on-site review. IV. CONCLUSION In conclusion, I can assure you that the sooner we can accurately measure the schools, the sooner we can improve them. We pledge to work with you in any manner you see fit to make sure all performance indicators hit the mark. Our members have expressed valid concerns with PBMAS. I’ll now let you hear directly from them.