NZJP Vol

The New Zealand Journal of Psychology SPECIAL ISSUE EDITORS Frank O’Connor Moa Resources Wellington Ian M. Evans Massey University Wellington SPECIAL ISSUE COORDINATOR Tia Narvaez Massey University and Victoria University of Wellington EDITOR-IN-CHIEF John Fitzgerald The Psychology Centre Hamilton ASSOCIATE EDITORS Neville Blampied Department of Psychology University of Canterbury Janet Leathem School of Psychology Massey University at Wellington Bronwyn Campbell School of Māori Studies Massey University at Palmerston North Harlene Hayne Department of Psychology University of Otago Michael O’Driscoll Department of Psychology University of Waikato

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The New Zealand Journal of Psychology is published online in three editions a year (articles will be posted as they become available) by the New Zealand Psychological Society Inc. Content may include manuscripts and shorter research notes in any substantive area of Psychology, and book reviews. Submitted manuscripts may be (a) empirical, (b) reviews of the literature, or (c) discussions of theoretical/conceptual frameworks of relevance to the practice of Psychology. Manuscripts will be considered for publication if they (a) include data collected from New Zealand samples, or (b) discuss the relevance of issues contained in the manuscript to the New Zealand social and cultural context, or to the practice of Psychology in this country. For further clarification of these requirements, please contact the Editor. See Instructions to Authors at the back for notes on preparation and submission of manuscripts and material. The material published in this issue is copyright to the New Zealand Psychological Society  2011. Publication does not necessarily reflect the views of the Society. Subscriptions Subscription to the Journal is included in Membership of the Society. Non-members may subscribe at NZ$60.00 per volume/year (three issues), plus GST (NZ only) and postage (overseas). Subscription and advertising enquiries should be addressed to the: Business Manager New Zealand Journal of Psychology NZ Psychological Society Inc. P.O. Box 4092, Wellington, New Zealand Tel +64.4.4734884; Fax +64.4.4734889 Email [email protected]

Production, printing & distribution is managed by the National Office of the NZ Psychological Society. New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 40, No. 4. 2011

SPECIAL ISSUE REVIEWERS Carrie Barber University of Waikato Margaret Beekhuis Psychology Associates, Christchurch Neville Blampied University of Canterbury

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Tia Narvaez, a Victoria University of Wellington graduate student, recently transferred from Massey, provided reviewer and author liaison and administrative support for this Special Issue. The Editors greatly appreciate her timely and accurate communication, prompts and followup. Her good humour made rescheduling drafting much less stressful.

Ian de Terte Massey University

Geoff Trotter, Tony Brunt and Ross Becker, photographers of Christchurch, have allowed us to use, at no charge, their images to help people understand the changes underway for Canterbury.

Cashel Street from above, running away from the Bridge of Remembrance at lower left, on 31 July, 2011 – ©2011 Geoff Trotter

Jeanie Douché School of Health Sciences, Massey University Mai Frandsen University of Tasmania, Australia Bruce Glavovic School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University Thomas Huggins Joint Centre for Disaster Research Brett Hunt Massey University Barbara Kennedy Massey University Nigel Long School of Aviation, Massey University John McClure Victoria University of Wellington Tia Narvaez Massey University Barry Parsonson Group Special Education, NZ Ministry of Education Douglas Paton University of Tasmania, Australia Gary Steel Lincoln University Ruth Tarrant Massey University

New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 40, No. 4. 2011

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The New Zealand Journal of Psychology Volume 40, Number 4, 2011

CONTENTS Foreword

John Fitzgerald, Editor-in-Chief

1

The Context in which We Examine Disasters in New Zealand: An Editorial

Frank O’Connor, David M. Johnston, Ian M. Evans

2

New Zealanders’ Judgments of Earthquake Risk Before and After the Canterbury Earthquake: Do they Relate to Preparedness?

John McClure, Celine Wills, David Johnston, Claudia Recker

7

Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Disaster: Lessons for New Zealand from the Aftermath of the Georgian-Russian conflict in 2008

Barry S. Parsonson, Jane-Mary CastelfrancAllen

12

Community Engagement Post-Disaster: Case Studies of the 2006 Matata Debris Flow and 2010 Darfield Earthquake, New Zealand

Susan Collins, Bruce Glavovic, Sarb Johal, David Johnston

17

Psychosocial Recovery from Disasters: A Framework Informed by Evidence

Maureen F. Mooney, Douglas Paton, Ian de Terte, Sarb Johal, A. Nuray Karanci, Dianne Gardner, Susan Collins, Bruce Glavovic, Thomas J. Huggins, Lucy Johnston, Ron Chambers, David M. Johnston

26

The Communication of Uncertain Scientific Advice During Natural Hazard Events

Emma E. H. Doyle, David M. Johnston, John McClure, Douglas Paton

39

Post-Earthquake Psychological Functioning in Adults with Attention-Deficit / Hyperactivity Disorder: Positive Effects of Micronutrients on Resilience

Julia J. Rucklidge, Neville M. Blampied

51

After the Earthquakes: Immediate Post-Disaster Work with Children and Families

Richard Sawrey, Charles Waldegrave, Taimalieutu Kiwi Tamasese, Allister Bush

58

Organisational and Cultural Factors that Promote Coping: With Reference to Haiti and Christchurch

John Fawcett

64

PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLES

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New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 40, No. 4. 2011

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS An Overview of the Canterbury District Health Board Mental Health Service’s Response to the 2010 - 2011 Canterbury Earthquakes

Ron Chambers, Rose Henderson

70

Promoting Recovery and Building Resilience for Individuals and Communities

Eileen Britt, Martin Dorahy, Janet Carter, Petra Hoggath, Ainslee Coates, Marie Meyer, Katharina Naswall

76

NZ Defence Force Response to the Christchurch Earthquake of February 2011

Geoff Sutton, Marty Fourie

79

People, Places and Shifting Paradigms – when ‘South Island’ Stoicism isn’t Enough

Shelley Dean

83

Principles guiding Practice and Responses to Recent Community Disasters in New Zealand

Rose Brown

86

Provision of Support to Schools and Early Childhood Services after the Pike River Disaster

Patrick McEntyre

90

The Education Welfare Response Following the February 2011 Earthquake

Bill Gilmore, Candice Larson

92

Long Term Support in Schools and Early Childhood Services after February 2011

Shelley Dean

95

Lubricating Civic Reconstruction: Reducing Losses due to Inter-Organisational Friction

Frank O'Connor

98

For Better or for Worse: How Initial Support Provision Adapted to Needs

Jonathan Black, Jay McLean

111

How Communities in Christchurch Have Been Coping with Their Earthquake

Libby Gawith

121

Living with Volcanic Risk: The Consequences of, and Response to, Ongoing Volcanic Ashfall from a Social Infrastructure Systems Perspective on Montserrat

Victoria Sword-Daniels

131

Immediately

SPECIAL ISSUE LINKS

139

INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS

141

New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 40, No. 4. 2011

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Advocacy

Established in 1947, NZPsS is the largest professional association for psychologists in Aotearoa / New Zealand. Over 1,200 practitioner, academic and student psychologists are members and subscribers of the NZPsS, from diverse sub-disciplines and work environments. The NZPsS is an incorporated society, governed by an elected National Executive, and managed by an executive director and staff based in its National Office in Wellington. The Society has an institute and branch matrix structure of specialism and regional groups. The Society exists to: ●

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Promote the discipline of psychology as a science and the practice of psychology as a profession Promote the development and use of psychological knowledge for alleviation of social problems and reduction of social inequalities, consistent with the principle of empowerment Promote high standards of ethical and professional conduct and practice by psychologists Promote the teaching and dissemination of knowledge and skill in basic and applied psychology Ensure that all its policies and practices are responsive to Te Tiriti o Waitangi and to New Zealand’s cultural diversity Ensure that the New Zealand Psychological Society is a highly valued, proactive and successful professional body that operates to best practice principles

Awhi kokiringa ā whakamatau hinengaro i Aotearoa —————————————————Supporting and advancing psychology in Aotearoa New Zealand • vi•

The Society expresses the collective views of psychologists in government and non-government environments and in the media. The Society advocates on behalf of its members on professional and clientrelevant issues. Society position statements express our strategic direction and policies on issues which impact on the psychological services and the health and welfare of New Zealanders. They are developed using members’ expertise and may be changed or added to over time.

In addition to monthly news for members, the Society publishes. Psychology Aotearoa twice yearly, to inform members about relevant practice, research, social and political issues, celebrate the achievements of members; give a forum for bicultural exchange; show contributions from students; air views of members and connect members with their peers. Code of Ethics All members receive a copy of the national Code of Ethics, written with significant input by Society members, which guides legal practice for New Zealand psychologists and safeguards individual and community wellbeing.

Professional Development Members pay reduced rates at our full range of professional development events. Workshops are held around the country and in conjunction with the annual conference. Events use local and international expertise to assist members to enhance skills and knowledge, and to maintain continuing competence, a requirement of registration with the New Zealand Psychologists Board. Annual Conference The location of the annual conference moves about the country. The conference allows members and non-members to present to their peers, to hear cutting edge international and local experts, to attend workshops and to network with colleagues. Publications The New Zealand Journal of Psychology is a peer-reviewed journal, published about psychology relevant to New Zealand and our neighbours. The Society publishes up-to-date guidebooks relevant to practice and research in New Zealand. Information and Resources The Society’s position statements, submissions and media releases can be found on our website’s public pages. Information and links to useful professional resources are also there, with links to some resources for the public. The website also carries member-only information, news, and publications.

Referral Database Members can choose to place their details on the NZPsS website referral database, which provides the public with a facility to locate psychologists in particular areas of practice in New Zealand. Cultural Justice and Equity The Society has a commitment to Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the attainment of cultural and social justice and equity. It has a National Standing Committee on Bicultural Issues, which contributes to publications and advises the Executive on policy development and action. Awards and Fellowship The Society makes awards to recognise psychologists’ excellence in research and practice, and contributions to the profession and its public. Links and Networks The Society assists members to connect with colleagues through branch activities, membership of institutes/divisions and special interest groups. The Society is affiliated with the Royal Society of New Zealand and the International Union of Psychological Science and has links and MOUs with psychological societies in other countries. Find us at www.psychology.org.nz,, call us on +64.4.4734884 or email us at [email protected]

New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 40, No. 4. 2011

Foreword John Fitzgerald, Editor-in-Chief, New Zealand Journal of Psychology

On behalf of the New Zealand Journal of Psychology and the New Zealand Psychological Society (NZPsS), I would like to open this Supplementary Issue by acknowledging the generosity of spirit and energy of those who have worked so hard to bring this project to completion. Psychologists and their professional affiliates in Canterbury recognised the importance of the work they could do to assist the population during recovery from the earthquakes beginning on 4 September, 2010. As the aftershocks continued these psychologists continued their efforts to help with clinical treatment, public awareness, in-school services and in support of organisations and people involved in reassessing and repairing the physical, social and environmental damage. Professional support came from psychologists and allied professionals around the country and from further afield. A lot of the effort was unpaid, motivated by doing something for the city and its people. During October 2010, Frank O’Connor (President of the NZPsS, quarter-time Christchurch resident and one of this issue’s guest editors) asked some of those directly involved if they would consider telling of their experiences, with whatever professional comparisons and reflection time allowed, at the 2011 NZPsS annual conference. The invitation was taken up, reflecting the breadth of research and practice of the discipline: clinical research, organisational development, educational crisis response, community perspectives and counselling practices.

In June 2011, just two months prior to the annual conference of the NZPsS I was approached by the guest editors with a proposal. They had now a three-day symposium entitled “Earthquake: Response and Recovery” of 21 presentations directly related to the experiences of those in Christchurch, or on closely associated themes. A number of the presenters were Cantabrians living in the earthquake zone, or were people who had some association with the events which had unfolded since September 2010. This issue’s guest editors, Frank O’Connor (symposium convenor) and Prof Ian Evans (Massey University), wanted to capture the content of the symposium for publication so that the wisdom, knowledge, and humanity expressed would not be lost, but rather that it be made freely available to all New Zealanders and other interested parties. This extra issue of the Journal exists largely due to their foresight, creativity and diligence. Frank O’Connor and Ian Evans played significant roles during the conference by chairing sessions, leading discussions, and generally keeping proceedings on track. The whole symposium was audio recorded. Formal manuscripts of presentations were used where available. We are indebted to the many authors who presented their experiences and

New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 40, No. 4. 2011

knowledge. We are also grateful for the encouragement and practical support of the Joint Centre for Disaster Research. All the presentations were transcribed, and we are grateful to Tia Narvaez (Massey and then Victoria University of Wellington) for her supportive work ensuring that the editors did not get too tangled in the morass of audio and digital files, and manuscripts. We are also grateful to the many reviewers who read and reread the manuscripts, assisting the authors and editors in polishing the final product. Finally, Frank O’Connor turned his hand to typesetting and Ian Evans, once again, demonstrated his familiarly with the contents of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association. The original goal of the guest editors was to ‘capture the moment’ so that time could be taken to reflect, review and learn, honouring the experiences and those who had experienced it. I believe that this has been achieved, and the NZPsS owes a great debt to those involved in the production of this publication. We thank all the psychologists who have contributed to this work, and the work it reports.

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The Context in which We Examine Disasters in New Zealand: An Editorial Frank O’Connor, Moa Resources David Johnston, Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey University and GNS Science Ian M. Evans, Massey University

This is a tale of two earthquakes (you could say many more on account of persistent aftershocks) that were, in a Dickensian way, the best of times and the worst of times. It is a tale of two cities as well. There are a lot of contrasts between the east and the west of the city, and between the two events, as well as lots of comparisons. In September 2010 we had good luck. We had a night-time earthquake, and it happened in a rural area so the shaking intensity decreased the closer you were to town. We thought we had seen it all in September, but tragically, this was not the only major event. We had good luck in September. We had extremely bad luck in February, 2011. The central business district was built on soft soils. An unknown fault axis was directed straight at it. No other known geological configuration could have delivered Christchurch a worse event. Our luck ran out that lunchtime—the geological gun barrel pointing straight at the centre of the city was loaded by years of gradual pressure, primed by the events of and since September and delivered an earthquake like no other to the Christchurch central business district and southern and eastern suburbs. This was, indeed, bad luck. The fault could have been orientated a different way, but it was orientated in the way it was. We might

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have known about it, but we didn’t. We might have had another jolt like September, but we got some of the greatest ground accelerations ever recorded anywhere on this planet – right in the heart of Christchurch. It was actually the greatest vertical acceleration ever instrumentally recorded at almost 2g. We can still see and feel the consequences of that release of energy. Of all the many physical, social, environmental, and economic aspects of natural disasters, the psychological dimension is arguably the most important to humans. Whether in terms of preparing adequately for a disaster, functioning effectively in the midst of catastrophe, or coping with and surviving emotionally the aftermath, psychological understanding provides a critical domain of both theory and practice that determines the crucial outcome: the effects on people’s lives and wellbeing. This flows into how we change our physical world, and our relationship with the land and our history. The New Zealand Psychological Society Supports Learning The New Zealand Psychological Society promotes the valuable role of the science and practice of psychology. In 2011, its President,

Frank O’Connor, organised an extensive three-day programme of research presentations, discussion, and information sharing at the annual conference of the Society in Queenstown. This was just a few months after the second and most devastating earthquake to disrupt the security and lives of thousands of people living and working in the Christchurch region. Aftershocks continue still, and were felt during the Conference. The New Zealand Psychological Society is the major professional organisation representing all areas and branches of culturally responsive psychological practice and research in Aotearoa New Zealand: clinical practitioners, educational ones working with schools and children, social, community and developmental psychologists involved with families and societal groups, and organisational specialists, working with other personnel to manage, lead, plan and evaluate organisational achievement. By bringing together such diverse interests, knowledge, and skills, Frank’s goal was to facilitate communication and to enhance the potential role of psychologists in making a difference to current and future disaster responsiveness in New Zealand. So successful was this exchange that we decided to capture

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O’Connor, Johnston & Evans

as much of the presentations as possible and to publish them in a special issue of the Society’s flagship journal. The current issue represents this effort, both in reproducing some of the more formal papers presented as well as capturing the informal presentations and discussion. We are impressed by the variety of papers revealing the richness of psychology’s potential contribution to psycho-social responses to a disaster such this, which has impacted the lives of so many people in Canterbury. The Joint Centre for Disaster Research Integrates Knowledge The conference symposium was co-sponsored by the Joint Centre for Disaster Research (JCDR). This Centre is a collaboration between the School of Psychology at Massey University and GNS Science, designed to bring a strong psychological and social science perspective to the outstanding contribution GNS Science makes in geophysical research. The Director of JCDR is Professor David Johnston. Until five years ago, he spent 15 years of his life with GNS Science, which is the Government Crown Research Institute which does geological investigation and monitoring. About five years ago, under David’s leadership, the social science team within GNS Science joined with Massey University faculty to form this joint research centre. The importance of such collaboration lies partly in a simple disconnect: the physical scientists of GNS Science understand the natural environment and the risk we face in New Zealand. But the difference between their understandings and how people perceive risk has never been fully recognised or explored. The JCDR had engaged somewhat with many Government departments in September. In February there was a more concerted effort to understand, across a range of organisations, what were the likely impacts of this event, and what overseas experience could help guide response and recovery efforts. New Zealand sits on a plate boundary, so we face a number of

perils. This particular subduction zone is very similar to what lies off Japan, so one future warning is that the tsunamis we saw in Japan one day in 2011 may also be seen along the east coast of the North Island. These are things we know about. But often there is a disconnection between this kind of knowledge and how the public see and respond to the risk. New Zealand has had a long history of earthquakes, several of which were magnitude 7+, but had not had any of magnitude 7+ in populated areas for a long time. From information to hand prior to the Canterbury earthquake, physical scientists had produced a hazard model for New Zealand. It was up-todate in terms of information available prior to the earthquake. It showed Canterbury in a moderate seismic risk zone—leadership in Christchurch, and engineers had talked about it for some years. Just as JCDR has a new setting to investigate, the longstanding partnership between the Engineering School and psychology faculty at the University of Canterbury has a new arena for collaboration. Psychological considerations include people’s understanding of the risk. Members of the public often say things like, “Wellington has a high risk of earthquakes.”, but there are other communities that have even higher probabilities than Wellington. Public perception and understanding does not often match statistical models. The probability of occurrence is not the same as the frequency of occurrence. If an area is more likely to have an earthquake, this does not mean that it will get the next one. We saw that with Kobe. The day before the Kobe earthquake in Japan the odds of Tokyo getting a major earthquake were three to four times greater than in Kobe. And higher or lower frequencies of having an event does not mean the next will, occur here. However a lot of people had been discounting the risk, because they were a lower probability or frequency than somewhere else. Peer-Reviewed Articles The articles in this special issue went through the peer review process

New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 40, No. 4. 2011

of ordinary submissions to the New Zealand Journal of Psychology, organised for this issue by Ian Evans. There were small variations, however. We asked the reviewers (two for each submission) to consider the practical merits of the contribution in addition to its scientific or scholarly potential. And, in most cases, it was not possible to conduct blind reviews: everyone knows everyone else in this field. Even so, the reviewers worked collaboratively with the very patient authors and we thank them for their speediness, their thoroughness, and their supportive ethos. We wanted a wide range of papers demonstrating some of the reach and range of psychology and the potential contribution of psychologists. The first paper, by Professor John McClure, takes up one of the themes of this Editorial: public perception is critical. He presents fascinating data on New Zealanders’ perceptions of earthquake risk in different parts of the country—a crucial element of future preparedness by communities and individuals. The second paper, based on practical experiences in a different setting (the Republic of Georgia) and a different type of disaster (a short, destructive, civil war), offers valuable lessons for any psychologist hoping to provide mental health support to a traumatised population. Barry Parsonson and JaneMary Castelfranc-Allen, two New Zealand clinical psychologists who have made a long-term, highly valued contribution to establishing appropriate mental health services for children in Georgia, describe their experiences and suggest the important lessons to be learned. A critical lesson is the importance of local community engagement as opposed to the more distant and sometime misguided role of large service organisations, and it this theme of community engagement that is analysed in the third paper by Susan Collins and colleagues from JCDR. Their report, that people impacted by disaster felt isolated and forgotten, is not unlike the experience of Georgians, many kilometres and cultures distant. This reveals the significance of community participation as well as engagement. •3•

The Context in which We Examine Disasters in New Zealand: An Editorial

From these interesting samples of the relevance of psychological understanding, we can see the importance of research and consultation linking the social and behavioural sciences with the geophysical sciences. The next paper in the series explains the nature and role of the consultation provided to Christchurch, with many of the themes identified in the two previous papers being emphasised again, such as training mental health providers and achieving community engagement. You can see from the range and varied backgrounds of the authors of this paper the importance of bringing together many different professional perspectives. Then follow two papers representing unique scientific contributions. Emma Doyle is a volcanologist by training but she has taken to heart the disconnect we mentioned earlier regarding the geological perspective and the psychological perspective. Geophysicists report probabilities in a variety of ways. They know what they mean. But the public and the emergency managers who have to warn the public may not know what they mean. This body of work represents an extremely important contribution to emergency management preparedness and response capability. A second paper with a strong empirical basis is the sixth in this series, by University of Canterbury behavioural and clinical scientists Neville Blampied and Julia Rucklidge. The Christchurch earthquakes provide an intervention of stress, permitting a natural experimental approach. It seems we can take advantage of the potential for knowledge building about how individuals respond to stress. In their ingenious study, we see some of the first evidence of the benefits of micronutrients for anxiety and depression. We end the peer-reviewed papers with two intriguing explorations of the fundamental importance of culture. Like the Georgia experience of Parsonson and Rawls, Richard Sawrey and his colleagues draw from their participation in offering psychological “first-aid” to the people of Samoa •4•

after the devastating tsunami. By combining cultural knowledge with sound principles from narrative and family therapy this multi-cultural team was able to provide valuable training for support people in Canterbury. Their paper also offers important caveats regarding the nature of initial services for people who have experienced trauma. Drawing another cultural parallel, John Fawcett adds crucial insights derived from his distinguished career in the provision of international aid and relief following natural disasters. Surely many people, horrified at the tragedy in Haiti, will be aware of how easy it is to push the plight of the people of Haiti from everyday concern and consciousness. That is a phenomenon that we trust will never be true for Christchurch as the threat to normal and stable life in the region continues unabated.

of psychology to assist in disaster situations. Correspondence with the authors is encouraged, especially to clarify reasons for choosing particular actions in the setting described. We note too that most of the authors of these proceedings receive no funding for the time involved in preparation. Their considerable hours are an uncosted public good, donated by psychologists for the benefit of their communities and professional colleagues.

Conference Presentations At the three day conference, however, there were many other valuable presentations that either the authors wished to remain as a more informal narrative format, or that the presenters did not have time to rework as a paper, or after peer review it was felt the material was more suited to a presentation format. We had the presentations tape-recorded and transcribed and then invited the speakers to edit them briefly for the special issue. In many cases, authors added material developed in the months and events prior to publication.

In addition to the earthquake response, a number of other community disasters in New Zealand have needed professional support in school and pre-school settings. Five presentations cover work by educational psychologists. The presentations demonstrate quick adaptation to differing needs and to strengthen short and long term responses in the education setting.

As a result, the presentation documents, edited by Frank O’Connor, have a large amount of supplementary material which will be of interest to many. We did not want the wisdom and experience of so many skilled individuals to be lost. Each presentation offers the views and experience of its authors, for others to consider in the event of similar situations arising in future. While some inferences are drawn about relevance of these experiences to other settings, these proceedings have not been peer reviewed, may not cite all relevant references, and should be regarded as part of a large body of learning in progress in the application

Conference presentations included here open with an account of the provision of psychosocial support at various levels and in a context of evolving acceptance. The psychological services of the New Zealand Defence Force response to February 2011 Earthquake is described, with reflection on learnings and changes made.

O'Connor presents some organisational phenomenon peculiar to long-term uncertainty, relating the individual, group and intergroup experiences, with new tools to facilitate adaptation or improvement. Also looking at organisational needs, Black and McLean report aspects of organisations adjusting initial support provision as information on physical and social impacts became available. Gawith uses a community psychology perspective to report aspects of how communities in Christchurch have been coping as the year of aftershocks closes with no subterranean peace in sight. A complementary presentation from Sword-Daniels looks at the long-term adjustment of the population to the second decade of continuous hazard of volcanic ashfall on Montserrat. Again, the response of the people living in

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O’Connor, Johnston & Evans

uncertainty is reported and their priorities explored. Conclusion This special issue speaks of the experiences, knowledge, cultural awareness, and interpersonal understandings of professionals affiliated with the discipline of psychology. Such professionals have made and are making important contributions to many aspects of supporting Canterbury, post September and February earthquakes and subsequent aftershocks. The Canterbury context poses a substantial

challenge for all professionals, given that the earthquakes were without modern precedent and that their persistence appears unique. New Zealand is a small country in terms of population. Few people have not been directly affected by the lives and property lost, schools were disrupted and pupils scattered across the country, businesses and families were forced to move. Residents continue to face aftershocks and general disruption to everyday life. From the beginning in September 2010, to the end of January, over

10,000 aftershocks recorded.

have

been

We hope that New Zealand’s research community can learn from these events to help build more a resilient country in the years to come, in ways that reflect the world-views and priorities of all the people of the place. Perhaps we will see a more substantial focus on disaster research from New Zealand psychologists, as part of this process.

 Winter sun sets on new liquefaction, 13 June 2011 — ©2011 Geoff Trotter

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The Context in which We Examine Disasters in New Zealand: An Editorial

 Spring flowers rise, September 2011 — ©2011 Ross Becker

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New Zealand Journal of Psychology Vol. 40, No. 4. 2011

New Zealanders’ Judgments of Earthquake Risk Before and After the Canterbury Earthquake: Do they Relate to Preparedness? John McClure, Victoria University of Wellington Celine Wills, Victoria University of Wellington David Johnston, Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey University and GNS Science Claudia Recker, Victoria University of Wellington

Previous research has examined judgments about earthquake likelihood after citizens have experienced an earthquake, but has not compared judgments in the affected region with other regions. Following the Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, this research compared earthquake risk judgments in the affected region and those outside the region. Participants in Christchurch, Wellington and Palmerston North judged the likelihood of an earthquake before and after the 2010 Canterbury (Darfield) earthquake, near Christchurch. Wellington was chosen as there had been higher expectations of an earthquake in that area. Palmerston North was chosen to be comparable to Christchurch before the Darfield earthquake, in that many New Zealanders have expected an earthquake in Wellington, not Palmerston North. Participants judged earthquake likelihoods for their own city, for the rest of New Zealand and for Canterbury. Christchurch participants also indicated their preparedness before and after the earthquake. Expectations of an earthquake in Canterbury were low before the Darfield earthquake in all three regions and rose significantly after that earthquake. In contrast, Wellingtonians’ judgments of the likelihood of an earthquake in Wellington were high before the Darfield earthquake and did not rise after that earthquake. Christchurch participants’ risk perceptions showed only a weak relation to their preparedness. These results clarify how disasters such as major earthquakes affect judgments of earthquake risk for citizens inside and outside the affected area. The results show that these effects differ in cities where an earthquake is expected. Broader issues about preparing for earthquakes are also discussed. This paper focuses on the Christchurch earthquake in relation to risk perception and preparedness. Risk assessment is not the main factor in preparedness; in fact, risk assessment is often a weak predictor of being ready or prepared, as in the case of preparing for an earthquake. Some research finds no relationship between the two (risk assessment and preparing) (Cowan, McClure, & Wilson, 2002; Hurnen & McClure, 1997; McClure, Sutton, & Sibley, 2007; Slovic, Fischhoff, &

Lichtenstein, 1982; Spittal, McClure, Walkey, & Siegert, 2008). This is partly because many citizens are fatalistic and think that their actions will not make any difference (McClure, Allen, & Walkey, 2001; McClure, Walkey, & Allen, 1999; Spittal et al., 2008; Spittal, Siegert, McClure, & Walkey, 2002). However, recognition of the risk is a prerequisite for voluntary action, and unless people recognise the risk, they are unlikely to take action.

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One factor affecting risk perception is personal experience; usually, if people have a personal experience of the hazards, they take the risk more seriously (Burger & Palmer, 1992; Helweg-Larsen, 1999; Sattler, Kaiser, & Hittner, 2000). The Police are very familiar with this, and say that the comment they hear most often after accidents is: “I never thought it would happen to me.” This effect interacts with a second bias where people think disasters are going to happen to other people, not to

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Judgments of Earthquake Risk Before and After the Canterbury Earthquake

themselves (Burger & Palmer, 1992; Helweg-Larsen, 1999; Mileti & Darlington, 1995; Spittal, McClure, Siegert, & Walkey, 2005; Weinstein, 1980). The Christchurch Risk Study To clarify these risk biases, this paper reports a study that we carried out after the first Canterbury earthquake, the Darfield earthquake in September 2010 (McClure, Wills, Johnston, & Recker, 2011). We were interested in how people in Christchurch, Wellington and Palmerston North changed in their perception of risk of a future earthquake after a significant local earthquake. The questionnaire asked for Christchurch citizens’ recall of their pre-earthquake risk perception: “Before the Darfield earthquake, how probable did you think it was there would be a big earthquake in or near Christchurch?” A second question asked: “Since the Darfield earthquake, how probable do you rate a future earthquake in Christchurch?” The same questions were asked in Wellington and Palmerston North. Questions also asked Wellington and Palmerston North participants for their recall of the likelihood of an earthquake in their own city – and in any other part of New Zealand (NZ). Questions then asked for their judgments of the likelihood of a future earthquake in each of these three areas (Christchurch, their own city, and another part of NZ). Judgments were given on Likert scales. A related question asked “If you’ve previously thought an earthquake in or near Christchurch was unlikely, why was that?” with space for open ended responses that were coded by two coders. Questions on other issues asked “Were you aware of information and warnings to prepare prior to the earthquake?” and “did you see this information as relevant to you?” and for Christchurch citizens “Did you suffer serious damage to your home or not”; and for Wellington and Palmerston North citizens, whether they had friends, family or close

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acquaintances in Christchurch. Christchurch participants were also asked about their preparedness for an earthquake. The results have been published in McClure et al. (2011). In judgments of the likelihood of an earthquake in Christchurch before and after the September earthquake, likelihoods rose significantly in all three cities (Figure 1). There was a main effect for the ‘before and after the earthquake’ time factor, which shows that it was a similar effect across all three cities. Time showed that these likelihood judgments were correct; after the first earthquake (i.e., after September 2010), there was another big earthquake in Canterbury in February 2011. Interestingly, Wellingtonians expected an earthquake in Wellington prior to the earthquake more than Cantabrians did for Canterbury, and that expectancy in Wellington showed no change after the earthquake in Christchurch. So Wellingtonians did not think an earthquake in Wellington was any more likely after the September earthquake; and they were correct. In contrast, for Palmerston North, the rise in their expectancy of an earthquake looks modest (Figure 2) but is statistically significant. Thus Palmerston North citizens saw a likelihood of an earthquake in Palmerston North (and also in another part of New Zealand) as more likely after the Darfield earthquake.

 Figure 1. The perceived likelihood of an earthquake occurring in or near Christchurch before and after the Canterbury Earthquake. (1= not at all likely, 5 = very likely) These judgments of earthquake likelihood before the earthquake are recall data and thus subject to recall effects, but they are consistent with data collected before the earthquake (Becker, 2010). With regard to the question: “If you’ve previously thought an earthquake in or near Christchurch was unlikely, why was that?” the most frequent reply was “because Christchurch is not on a fault line”. Most Cantabrians are aware of the Alpine Fault, and they thought an earthquake was more likely near the Southern Alps or the Alpine Fault that runs down those Alps. They assumed there were no fault lines near Christchurch. Secondly, they said that there have not been any earthquakes in this region before (some qualified this view with the term ‘recently’). They found out after the earthquake that they were wrong: there had been earthquakes in the region. Many New Zealanders, including Cantabrians, did not know that the spire of Christchurch Cathedral, which collapsed in the February earthquake, had been knocked down by earthquakes twice before, in 1888 and 1901. The Cathedral was damaged less significantly by earthquakes in 1881 and 1922. As this all happened some time ago, people had either never known about it or forgotten.

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that it is not just Wellington that is at risk, and fortunately New Zealand’s building standards partially reflect this expert knowledge. What Is Preparedness and How Do We Increase It? There are three strands to action: legislation, incentives, and personal voluntary action.

 Figure 2. The perceived likelihood of an earthquake in participants’ own city before and after the Canterbury Earthquake in Wellington and Palmerston North. (1= not at all likely, 5 = very likely) Thirdly, they thought that Wellington (or the North Island) was at greater risk. And perhaps that was accurate in terms of probabilities. But events don’t always follow probabilities. This judgment reflects an interesting pattern. It is as if Christchurch people thought that Wellington is more likely to have the earthquake, and therefore they don’t (or didn’t) see a need to prepare in Christchurch. This view suggests a dangerous leap in people’s thinking, analogous to middle-aged people thinking: “teenagers more likely to have car accidents, so therefore I don’t need to drive safely.” Often the perceived likelihood of earthquakes does not relate to preparation. However, in this study, there was a weak but significant relationship between Christchurch people’s recall of the likelihood of an earthquake before the Darfield earthquake and their preparation. On the question “Were you aware of information and warnings to prepare prior to the earthquake”, there was no difference between the three cities. Interestingly, Christchurch people said they knew all about the warnings, but on the question “Did you see this

information as relevant to you”, they said they thought it wasn’t relevant to them because the earthquake was going to be in Wellington. People who have suffered harm or damage in an accident such as a car accident usually see the future risk of that hazard as higher. But in this case, when asked “Did you suffer serious damage to your home or not”, Christchurch citizens who suffered damage did not see the future risk from earthquakes as higher than those who had not experienced major damage. This differs from the usual finding and may reflect a ceiling effect. One novel finding is that Wellington and Palmerston North citizens with friends, family or close acquaintances in Christchurch saw the risk of another earthquake in Christchurch as higher. This finding is interesting, because it suggests that if people have an emotional bond to someone in Christchurch, they see the risk in Christchurch as higher. From a personal perspective, having a daughter in Christchurch who works every Saturday in an Addington café that is made of brick, which fortunately has been strengthened, one authour can understand that. In summary, these data offer some lessons for preparation strategies and lessons for the media. First, it is not just Wellington that is at risk of an earthquake. New Zealanders have a fixation on Wellington’s risk; this is analogous to adults who think that young people are the only ones with alcohol problems. Seismologists know

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Legislation The first is legislation. New Zealand does have building regulations for new buildings and, positively, New Zealand is a relatively non-corrupt country that enforces these regulations. As a consequence, there are not 2,000 or 10,000 people dead following the Canterbury earthquakes. Some countries have the same building regulations as New Zealand, but in earthquakes most of the buildings collapse due to corruption that has resulted in building standards not being enforced. The New Zealand regulations are also being steadily upgraded. No commercial building built since 1985 killed anybody, and nor did almost any private homes. In New Zealand, commercial buildings are made so that they won’t kill people in an earthquake, and those built since 1985 did not. However, perhaps they should be built as in Japan, so that they will still be useable after the earthquake. It would only cost 5-10% more in construction costs. Some old buildings in Christchurch had been strengthened, including both Christchurch Cathedrals. They are now badly damaged by the earthquakes, but if they had not been strengthened, they would have been like other historic buildings that are now a pile of rubble. Engineers knew that there is a lot of soft soil in the East of the city, and that if Christchurch were to have an earthquake, there would be considerable damage in these areas. Articles and TV documentaries in the 1990s reported this risk. New Zealanders cannot leave this issue to Councils; this is too dangerous, as Councils permit buildings on soils that are likely to liquefy in an earthquake. New Zealand may not have high levels of corruption, but Councils can •9•

Judgments of Earthquake Risk Before and After the Canterbury Earthquake

obviously be pressured by developers to permit building on unsuitable land. New Zealand therefore needs a national regulation stipulating that if people are building on soft soil or sand they need better foundations. Engineers could provide a formula for this; indeed, this principle is already being applied in the rebuild of Christchurch, where there are different building specifications for sites with different soil composition. Legislation could also require Councils to make the earthquake status of buildings public. Two councils (Hastings and Timaru) tried to conceal and withhold the known earthquake state of local buildings after the Canterbury earthquakes. They justified this action by saying that the information would make people panic. However, their lawyers told them that they legally had to reveal this information. In Wellington, some buildings in the city have been ‘red stickered’, with a notice on the window announcing that the building is a dangerous earthquake hazard. This is useful, but the notices are small, A4 size, and given the hazard, they should be a metre wide. The message should be strong. Legislation requires these messages to be prominent on cigarette packets. New Zealand also requires more retrofitting of old buildings. It is expensive. But if, after Hawkes Bay, Christchurch had just strengthened just four buildings a year, many of those lovely old brick buildings in Canterbury would have survived, as would their inhabitants. The retrofitted buildings are often not as strong as new buildings, but many of those in Christchurch that had been strengthened survived the earthquakes. Another useful, low-cost legislative requirement would be to put the earthquake rating of houses on the title. New Zealand has warrant of fitness requirements for cars but not for houses that are worth about $400,000 each on average. So New Zealand can do more with legislation. A warrant of fitness requires mechanics to check numerous safety features, but anyone can buy a brick house that will collapse like a pack of cards in an earthquake. If an Australian comes to New Zealand and doesn’t know that brick houses are • 10 •

time bombs in this country, they may find to their regret it is likely to collapse on them in an earthquake. Incentives In addition to legislation, another strategy is to use incentives, as giving people information is not enough to get them to prepare. Many insurance companies did not apply this principle to houses. If people want to drive a dangerous motorbike or are under 25, they pay more insurance, but at least before the Christchurch earthquakes, people could have a house that was totally unsafe, but pay no more insurance. When the disaster happens, the insurance companies must recover losses or go bankrupt, so everyone must pay (much) more insurance. Insurance could be targeted, or be more conditional. For example, if a house owner has a brick chimney, instead of the usual $400 premium, they might have to pay $800 a year, or have a higher excess. Personal readiness A key issue is focusing not just on response and recovery, but on readiness. The concept of civil defence is based on the analogy with military defence. Clearly, to have an effective military defence, if people at war are facing guns and tanks shooting at them, the best defence is not just an emergency kit to patch them up after they’ve been injured or maimed. For readiness and good defence, people need armour that protects them from being injured or killed. In civil defence, people need readiness as well as response and recovery. An important issue underpinning this concept of defence is that there are different types of preparedness. Having an emergency kit and water is one class of action, and in Wellington, this may be more important than Christchurch, because there are fewer access routes into Wellington, and Fonterra (a large milk supplier) may not convert its milk trucks into water trucks to rescue Wellingtonians. Thus, survival actions such as compiling an emergency kit are important. However, actions to mitigate or prevent damage made in advance of the quake are also important. These

include strengthening buildings, and replacing or reinforcing brick or unreinforced masonry. An example is the Hunter building at Victoria University. The University strengthened this quaint old building, and put concrete and steel bracing inside it – it is like inserting a backbone in a jellyfish. Yet despite the importance of these damage mitigation actions, preparedness messages focus almost solely on survival actions. On the day after the September earthquake, the Dominion Post newspaper ran a big feature saying: “Have you got your emergency kit, etc.” One author wrote a letter saying that this is good civic duty you are performing, but it would be useful to also remind people that they need to have a builder check their house. The newspaper duly printed the letter, but when the next earthquake happened on 22 February, the next day, the Dominion Post repeated the mantra “Have you got your emergency kit, etc.” The lesson about the importance of actions to mitigate damage was not learned. There needs to be a shift to focus on prevention, not just survival. When an earthquake happens, the importance of building strength and soil type is obvious. People need to get a builder to check their house or chimney. Our questionnaire found that only two out of 200 had done this. We have mentioned the analogy with military defence. After the Canterbury earthquakes, New Zealand had a window of opportunity where people in other cities were buying more bottles of water and other actions. But Civil Defence did not use this mild anxiety to get people to prepare. That seems to be a missed opportunity. Is not this what these agencies are being paid for? As a consequence, we have buildings like the Dean’s beautiful house, with three layers of brick, destroyed in the earthquake. The earthquake damage has cost 15 billion dollars. Preparedness in the form of strengthening buildings would have been expensive, but if builders had strengthened all the brick and unreinforced masonry buildings in Christchurch, this would have cost much less than 15 billion dollars. It’s not surprising that Canterbury people now think New Zealand should have

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stricter building regulations (Mitchell, 2011). References Becker, J. S. (2010). Understanding disaster preparedness and resilience in Canterbury: Results of interviews, focus groups and a questionnaire survey. GNS Science report 2010/50. Burger, J. M., & Palmer, M. L. (1992). Changes in and generalization of unrealistic optimism following experiences with stressful events: Reactions to the 1989 California earthquake. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 29-43. Cowan, J., McClure J., & Wilson, M. (2002). What a difference a year makes: how immediate and anniversary media reports influence judgments about earthquakes. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 169-185. Helweg-Larsen, M. (1999). (The lack of) optimistic bias in response to the Northridge earthquake: The role of personal experience. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 21, 119-129. Hurnen, F., & McClure, J. (1997). The effect of increased earthquake knowledge on perceived preventability of earthquake damage. Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, 3. 1-10. McClure, J., Allen, M. W., & Walkey, F. H. (2001). Countering fatalism: Causal information in news reports affects judgements about earthquake damage. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 23, 109-121.

McClure, J., Sutton, R M., & Sibley, C. G. (2007). Listening to reporters or engineers: How different messages about building design affect earthquake fatalism. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 37, 1956-1973. McClure, J., Walkey, F., & Allen, M. (1999). When earthquake damage is seen as preventable: Attributions, locus of control and attitudes to risk. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 48, 239-256. McClure, J., Wills, C., Johnston, D., & Recker, C. (2011). How the 2010 Canterbury (Darfield) earthquake affected earthquake risk perception: Comparing citizens inside and outside the earthquake region. Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, 2011-2, 1-10. Mileti, D. S., & Darlington, J. D. (1995). Societal response to revised earthquake probabilities in the San Francisco Bay area. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 13, 119145. Mitchell, J. (2011). Community insights on events from 4th to late September 2010. Report to the Regional Emergency Management Office. Canterbury CDEM Group. Sattler, D. N., Kaiser, C. F., & Hittner, J. B. (2000). Disaster preparedness: Relationships among prior experience, personal characteristics, and distress. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30, 1396-1420. Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1982). Facts versus fears: Understanding perceived risk. In D.

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Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.) Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristic and biases (pp. 463-492). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Spittal, M. J., McClure, J., Siegert, R. J., & Walkey F. H. (2005). Optimistic bias in relation to preparedness for earthquakes. Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, 2005-1, 1-10. Spittal, M., McClure, J., Walkey, F., & Siegert, R. (2008). Psychological predictors of earthquake preparation. Environment and Behavior, 40, 798817. Spittal, M. J., Siegert, R. J., McClure, J., & Walkey, F. H. (2002). The Spheres of Control scale: The identification of a clear replicable factor structure. Personality and Individual Differences, 32, 121-131. Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 806-820.

Authors’ Note The empirical results included in this paper have previously been reported in McClure, Wills, Johnston, & Recker, (2011) and the figures are reprinted here with permission from Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies. Correspondence should addressed to John McClure [email protected]

be at:

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Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Disaster: Lessons for New Zealand from the Aftermath of the Georgian-Russian conflict in 2008 Barry S. Parsonson, Applied Psychology International & Children of Georgia NGO Jane-Mary Castelfranc-Allen, Applied Psychology International & Children of Georgia NGO

The authors report experience in providing trauma-focused CBT training to 10 Georgian psychologists and psychiatrists following the 2008 Georgian-Russian conflict, and the experiences associated with the practicum involving victims and the actions of government and international agencies in the aftermath of that conflict. This serves as a backdrop to suggestions relating to the human issues that arise in the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes and for the delivery of post-disaster services in New Zealand. It is argued that psychologists should be included in our disaster response planning and in the response to any major disaster. We have been involved in training, researching, and developing services for children in Georgia for 15 years and have established Children of Georgia, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) which advocates on behalf of and for orphaned and disabled children in that country. Georgia became involved in a five-day military conflict with Russia over long-disputed territory in August 2008 and we had just left Georgia before the conflict broke out. Two months after the cessation of hostilities we returned to Georgia to assist in the provision of psychological trauma services for conflict victims. Over 160,000 people were displaced from the two regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, caught up in the fighting. In addition, many Georgian residents in the adjoining regions came under air or artillery attack and, in some instances, intrusion by Russian troops. The surviving victims of the struggle were in shock. Many had experienced or learned of unexpected and sudden death of family members, injury, rape, beatings, incarceration, loss of home, livelihood, separation from family and

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friends. Some had the additional strain of two to three days and nights trekking towards Georgian-controlled territory while trying to avoid capture by the South Ossetian militia or their Russian allies. In the aftermath of the conflict, the dispossessed and displaced persons faced placement from rural communities into tent villages or abandoned Government buildings in cities which frequently were unfit for habitation due to broken windows and lack of adequate cooking, toilet and bathroom facilities. Often, where families were intact, several generations were sharing single rooms. Many of them also faced a number of relocations over the following months, anxiety about the fate of missing family and friends, and a lack of social and mental health support services, minimal financial support, and no opportunities to work. Children who had been uprooted from village life eventually found themselves placed in unwelcoming urban schools, isolated from friends and peer group, and living with

distressed and, in increasing numbers, angry and depressed adults, some of whom (mostly males) turned to substance abuse and domestic violence. After 12 years involvement in Georgia, we were aware of the absence of psychologists and psychiatrists with training in cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) or knowledge of diagnosis and treatment of psychological trauma. We were also aware that the initial international disaster response would most likely last for a maximum of three months, leaving the small and essentially under-qualified and largely unprepared local mental health services to pick up the burdens of post-war trauma that would continue to emerge with the passage of time. Consequently, we returned with the intention of offering an intensive programme of trauma-focussed CBT training that would train mental health professionals as both therapists and competent trainers. This was in keeping with the philosophy of our work in Georgia, which has always been to leave behind locals with knowledge and skills for both

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independent practice dissemination to others.

and

From this Georgian experience we identified some relevant strategies for application to disaster response in New Zealand which, due to its vulnerability to significant seismic, volcanic and climatic events, needs to have available psychological services to meet the human consequences of natural disasters. We foreshadowed some aspects of this in an earlier paper (Parsonson & Rawls, 2010) and expand upon them here. Establishing Programme

a

Training

Our first action was to make contact with regional UNICEF and the World Health Organisation (WHO) teams co-ordinating the mental health responses to the conflict’s victims by local and international NGOs. It was evident that there was no planning for the longer term trauma that would surely emerge over time. Nor was there any financial provision to support training of personnel for that eventuality. The entire focus was on psychological “first aid,” often involving essentially untrained individuals who were tasked with setting up activity centres for children and “counselling” for adults. Thus, the need for training in trauma-focused CBT was evident so we planned a curriculum and began to recruit potential trainees. The trainees Seven female psychologists with post-graduate training in clinical psychology and one female and two male psychiatrists (one still an intern) were selected for the programme following a call for expressions of interest. All met the training criteria in that they had some experience of clinical work and all spoke and read English well enough to understand the lectures and course readings. They also had to be available to stay in the programme for six days per week and for the planned duration of seven weeks. Given the need, their various employers were keen to involve them in the programme and agreed to these terms. While no trainees had been directly involved in the conflict, all had had contact with family, friends,

or associates who had had more direct experience or some experience of clients seeking help for trauma related disorders as a result of involvement. The training programme The seven week programme was designed to provide skills for assessment and intervention with trauma victims. It comprised lectures, discussions, problem-solving, set readings and research reviews as homework, supervised practicum and practice at teaching and disseminating the newly learned skills. Participants were graded on participation, homework completion, practicum performance and dissemination skills. The final examination activity involved presenting a team seminar on trauma and CBT to staff of NGOs and international organisations likely to benefit from training they could now offer. In addition, from the beginning, there was agreement that we would protect each other from personal traumatisation from course content or processes. The initial focus was on training in assessment, including clinical interviewing using systematic modes of information gathering on demographics, trauma exposure, problem identification and what symptoms were present, when, where, how often they occurred, etc., and use of data gathering methods such as SUDS (Subjective Units of Distress), to obtain a quantitative measure of intensity of experienced emotional response. There was also coverage of the diagnosis of trauma-related disorders, especially acute and lateremerging trauma-related symptoms, and the commonly associated disorders such as depression, panic and anxiety disorders, sleep disturbance and phobias. In addition, identification of such collateral problems as substance abuse, selfmedication and domestic violence was included. Once trained in assessment and diagnosis, the trainees were taken to two “Collection Centres” for internally displaced persons (IDPs) set up by the hastily formed Georgian Ministry for Refugees, one in Tbilisi and one in Gori. Here they consulted

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with community leaders and centre organisers to identify potential adult and child clients. Once informed consent was obtained, these persons were interviewed and diagnosed under our supervision and planning of appropriate interventions was undertaken in the setting of the class. The trainees had to learn to cope with the very distressing revelations of these clients, mostly the elderly, women, and children, and to comprehend the great losses experienced and the current life challenges that they faced. Potential male clients typically denied symptoms or problems described by their wives or mothers and all refused to participate. Concurrent with ongoing assessment and initial intervention planning, training in CBT was initiated. This focussed first on basic knowledge of CBT and then on building skills in a range of techniques including anxiety, panic and sleepdisturbance management through diaphragmatic breathing and deep muscle relaxation, graduated exposure and systematic desensitisation to assist with reducing avoidance, phobias and panic. Managing re-experiencing, normalising and reinterpreting trauma responses such as numbing and hypervigilance via cognitive restructuring, and CBT strategies for depression and anger management were also included. As these skills were gained, the trainees, again under our supervision, began the planned interventions, primarily for sleepdisorders, re-experiencing, panic and anxiety attacks, avoidance and hypervigilance, as well as for anger and depression. Some clients presented with psychosomatic symptoms, in part because this is a more socially acceptable expression of psychological disorder in Georgian society. Naturally, we found that each client had responded differently to their personal experience of trauma. We found that the trainees became captivated by the observed and reported changes in their clients, signalling that the efficacy of their newly acquired skills had won their understanding of how beneficial this approach to intervention could be. • 13 •

Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Disaster: Lessons from Georgia

Following successful completion of their training, a number of the graduates went on to work with NGOs and mental health services, providing both interventions and training within those organisations. In addition, they helped establish a Georgian Association for Cognitive Behaviour Therapy to encourage and support the expansion of local interest in CBT. Outcomes of the training relevant to New Zealand Firstly, it was evident that mental health professionals without prior knowledge of CBT could be trained within a short but intensive period of time to a good level of competence using the training model we applied,. This meant a core group of trainers of trainers could be available to go to a disaster zone and both contribute to interventions for traumatised persons and up-skill local professionals so that they, in turn, could continue to offer effective psychological trauma intervention services to the community over the longer term. Secondly, the Psychology Department of the Tbilisi State University asked us to adapt our training programme to enable their staff to deliver it to clinical psychology graduate students so that it could be incorporated into a broader course on CBT. We successfully trialled this adapted programme with Georgian graduate students in 2009 and shared the curriculum with the University. This suggests that our New Zealand post-graduate clinical, educational, and other professional practice psychology courses could very usefully incorporate traumafocussed CBT into their programmes as a contribution to future disaster response capacity. These potential contributions from clinical psychology are especially important given that post-traumatic symptoms may affect a significant proportion of a community exposed to a major traumatic event (Bal, 2007; Briere & Scott, 2006 and may continue to evidence themselves long after the traumatic event(s) (Bal, 2007; Koenen et al., 2008) .

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Coordinating the Mental Health Response Any disaster of significant magnitude cannot be coped with by local organisations and service providers alone. In Georgia there was a massive international response involving the International Red Cross (IRC), Médicines sans Frontièrs (MSF) and a number of smaller aid organisations such as Terre des Hommes. These and local NGOs offering mental health services were co-ordinated by the World Health Organisation (WHO) mental health cluster panel which we (as part of the Children of Georgia NGO response) joined. What this cluster approach did achieve through its weekly meetings was a record of who was doing what and where and how many IDP ‘collection centres’ were being served and by whom. It was also possible to monitor where there were gaps in the service provision and what new issues were beginning to become evident. For example, increases in domestic violence and substance abuse were identified early, as was the emerging problem of serious and untreated trauma among the military and emergency service personnel. The absence of any local specialist services that could recognise and address these problems within the community or the military and emergency services was a major concern that remained unresolved at the time. On the downside, we quickly discovered that while it was a sound idea to invite participation in a coordinated approach to service delivery, there was a distinct lack of mental health expertise among most of those organisations represented at the meetings. In addition, there was no process for determining who could actually offer appropriate services to the large and widely dispersed population of internally displaced persons flowing into Georgian towns and cities from the conflict zones and the associated “buffer” zones bounding the disputed territories. In addition, it was evident that major international aid organisations, such as the IRC and MSF, initially did not actually collaborate or co-operate with local service providers. For instance, our offers to train local psychologists

for MSF were rebuffed and their chief mental health professional had not heard of CBT and insisted on a psychoanalytic approach. We also encountered “territorial” challenges from MSF when we began training our team because they considered one of the IDP ‘collection centres’ was in “their” area, even though no service was provided at this location by their staff. Fortunately, the latter situation was resolved amicably at the local level and our training effort and the subsequent work in that centre by members of our team went unhindered. The WHO cluster meeting also allowed for planning around data gathering and follow-up in the affected communities. A subgroup, which included members of Children of Georgia, World Vision and the local branch of the Global Initiative in Psychiatry (GIP) worked on a survey designed to assess the impact of the conflict, the adequacy of the postconflict service delivery, and access to, and availability and quality of, essential mental health services in IDP and “buffer zone” communities. The data from this survey were analysed and reported back to the WHO (Rawls, 2009), revealing the need for more effective, community-based diagnostic and intervention services into the buffer zone and identification of the barriers to services that confronted persons located outside of the major population centres, where most of the available services were concentrated. When IDPs presented with trauma-related disorders, available medical services commonly prescribed out-dated, , medications, such as benzodiazepines, despite psychiatrists warning against such use. Perhaps this was all that was available. A complication is that such disorders were often presented by patients as physical symptoms to avoid the stigma of mental illness. Outcomes of coordinating a mental health response Firstly, having a coordinated response and monitoring procedure, such as that of the WHO mental health cluster, was good: it provided a degree of oversight, organisation, and order in the service delivery process.

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Secondly, it allowed for a degree of sharing between participating service providers over what services and skills were available and education on the nature of appropriate (best-practices) and inappropriate responses to trauma. Thirdly, it pointed to the need for disaster response co-ordinators to have some process for evaluating the quality and likely efficacy of support services that a wide range of organisations were prepared to offer. It is now well established (e.g., Amaya-Jackson & DeRosa, 2007; Foa, Keane, & Friedman, 2000) that CBT is the most effective intervention for trauma and that approaches such as post-event counselling can actually interfere with recovery (Foa et al., 2000). While psycho-educational programmes are likely to be effective for some, there need to be diagnostic and triage systems in place for identifying and referring more severe cases of trauma to appropriate psychological services. In addition, the community survey revealed a need for a multi-level response to trauma identification and referral. For example, teachers, public health nurses, and some local community service providers needed to be trained to recognise emerging trauma symptoms and to know where to refer potential clients to appropriate services. In more isolated or smalltown rural communities, primary health care providers needed training in provision of psychological first aid and in the diagnosis of trauma disorders. In some instances, the training of teachers, selected parents, or even older school children in school-based disaster preparation could help in this process. It is evident from the Georgian experience coordination is important, to prevent friction between different service providers and to avoid overlap and concentration of services in some areas and an absence of services in others. The community survey also identified previously unrecognised barriers to service access, such as distance, isolation, lack of transport or funds to pay for services, gaps in the service provision outside of main

centres, and areas of unaddressed need, such as lack of adequate food, heating and blankets in collection centres in the face of an impending winter. There needs to be an awareness that psychologically traumatised people left without the means to access diagnostic and treatment services will often resort to selfmedication, either misusing prescription medications or opting for alternative, non-prescription drugs or substances. There is a need to educate GPs in appropriate forms of medical care so that prescription of psychotropic medication is not the sole or primary intervention for persons presenting with symptoms of trauma or trauma related disorders following a disaster. Finally, the Georgian situation also highlighted the need for central and regional government and the disaster response coordination body to have representation by appropriately qualified psychologists and for these bodies to be prepared to hear and respond to human needs and concerns rather than to primarily focus on damaged infrastructure alone. The Relocation Phase With large numbers of distressed people in temporary and/or very poor quality housing, with inadequate resources, services and support and the onset of winter around the corner, the authorities, already overburdened by the enormity of an unexpected event, took far too long to put together a systematic approach to identifying and relocating families and communities. As a result, anger, resentment, further distress and a loss of faith in the authorities emerged. These emotions were typically expressed very strongly to any agency, especially those involved in disaster relief and welfare, visiting centres where the people felt abandoned and disenfranchised. Sometimes the response by the authorities was to simply avoid or abandon such centres, which only had the effect of increasing both distress and anger in the effected population. As its response following the conflict, the World Bank provided

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USD20 million in housing redevelopment aid, along with approved plans for construction of dwellings for IDPs on government land in rural areas, some within sight of the South Ossetian lands from which the IDPs had been evicted. The houses were small, built in long rows and had shared outdoor long-drop toilet facilities, with one toilet between every four houses. Water was not reticulated to homes; communal hand pumps, drawing water from the aquifer, were provided. The overriding focus was on getting a roof over peoples’ heads within relative safety. There was a complete absence of urban or social planning, with no provision for schools, churches, shops, community centres or sports fields. The rural location meant that access to work (if there was any), schools, and services was only possible with some form of vehicular transport. Due to a lack of consideration of the need for social planning, there was no deliberate component in the World Bank response to try to assign people from the same villages or neighbourhoods into the new settlements, ignoring the traditionally strong Georgian affiliations with their home villages and neighbourhoods. This failure in planning exacerbated the great sense of social disruption that overwhelmed many of the displaced families. Often, after visiting these houses, families chose to stay in their existing inadequate collection centre housing and wait for a promised government grant to fund the purchase of their own accommodation. This often led to their expulsion from their temporary accommodation and some are still waiting for relocation and/or the government payout. Others simply chose to return to unsafe areas dubbed “buffer zones” and live in a constant state of vigilance as the price of providing shelter for their families. Outcomes of relocation relevant to New Zealand Firstly, after a major disaster, such as that in Christchurch, it is essential that already traumatised and distressed persons have good information and access to services in the immediate aftermath and that there is ongoing consideration of their needs, along

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Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Disaster: Lessons from Georgia

with identification and rapid resolution of barriers to accessing services and to housing and employment problems. Normalisation is an important component of the trauma recovery process. The longer people are left to their own devices, with their lives in tatters and no sense of an end to the abnormal conditions in which they find themselves, the greater the social upheaval and emotional distress they are likely to experience. Secondly, promises made need to be promises kept. Anger, disappointment and disaffection with the bodies responsible for getting people back on their feet are all likely to provoke in the population a deep sense of disapproval of the efforts of the authorities and a belief that no one is listening to their cries for help, further adding to their trauma. Thirdly, when relocation does occur, it needs to have been planned in the context of cultural and social structures that existed in the original communities from which the persons have been displaced. Keeping families and neighbourhoods together so that they can maintain or re-establish bonds and relationships has to be a consideration when re-housing people from destroyed communities, as does planning for meeting the social, educational, religious, occupational, and lifestyle needs of those communities in the new setting. This points to a clear need for social and community psychology contributions and also broader social science input into the needs assessment and planning for newly constructed communities, rather than limiting the

• 16 •

focus to urban planning, architecture and essential services, matters which seem to dominate reconstruction efforts. Conclusions Although the Georgian experience arose out of war rather than a natural disaster, some of the lessons learned from the way the aftermath was handled can be seen to have bearing on the pre- and post-natural disaster planning in New Zealand. There is a need for: ●

training of the health professional workforce in effective, evidencebased short- and long-term trauma interventions

●

including psychologists in the disaster response planning process

●

having psychologists assist with coordination of mental health services and service provision so that these operate efficiently

●

use of psychological knowledge and research skills in evaluation of post-disaster needs and in planning and seeing through any resettlement programmes that are necessary.

Bal, A. (2007). Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Turkish child and adolescent survivors three years after the Mamara earthquake. Child & Adolescent Mental Health, 13(3), 134139. Briere, J., & Scott, C. (2006). Principles of trauma therapy: Symptoms, evaluation and treatment. New York: Sage. Foa, E. B., Keane, T. M., & Friedman, M. J. (Eds.) (2000). Effective treatments for PTSD. New York: Guilford. Koenen, K.C, Stellman, S.D., Sommer, J.F., & Stellman, J.M. (2008). Persisting posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms and their relationship to functioning in Vietnam veterans: A 14year follow-up. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 21(1), 49-57. Parsonson, B.S., & Rawls, J.M. (2010). Are we ready for the big one? Lessons from a brief war that could apply to New Zealand Primary Health Care services following a major disaster. (Guest Editorial) Journal of Primary Health Care, 2(3), September, 180-182. Rawls, J.M. (2009). An assessment of the mental health & psychosocial support needs of two groups of Georgian Internally Displaced Persons. Report to the World Health Organisation (Georgia). Tbilisi, Georgia.

Authors’ Note: References Amaya-Jackson, L., & DeRosa, R.R. (2007). Treatment considerations for clinicians in applying evidence-based practice to complex presentations in child trauma. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 20(4), 379-390.

J.M Rawls has since adopted her family names of Castelfranc-Allen and is co-author of this article. The authors may be contacted at [email protected]

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Community Engagement Post-Disaster: Case Studies of the 2006 Matata Debris Flow and 2010 Darfield Earthquake, New Zealand Susan Collins, Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey University Bruce Glavovic, Massey University Sarb Johal, Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey University David Johnston, Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey University/GNS Science

Engagement and participation are terms used to describe important processes in a democratic society. However, the definition and understanding of these terms is broad and varied. In a disaster context, community engagement and participation are recognised as important processes to support individual and community recovery. What these terms mean, who is responsible for leading engagement, and the processes that are to be used, are important issues that need to be clarified at the onset of recovery, if not before. Despite this, there are often barriers to community members being involved in the recovery process as active and valued participants. These include governance structures that do not adequately recognise the spectrum of community engagement and the power dynamics of information sharing and decision-making. This article discusses two New Zealand case studies where engagement activities were put in place to contribute to the communities’ post disaster recovery. Engagement is a construct that has different meanings in different contexts (Son & Lin, 2008). It is often used to describe a range of actions that take place between people and organisations. It can include a variety of approaches and styles of participation, such as one-way communication or information delivery, consultation, involvement and collaboration in decision-making, and empowered action in informal groups or formal partnerships. These terms also take on different meanings depending on the context (Goodman et al., 1998; Pretty, 1998). Hudson and Bruckman (2004) make the distinction that engagement only requires active mental attention, while participation requires the listeners to contribute to and shape the discussion. In a

preliminary findings report by the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2), it was identified that the term engagement meant different things to different people across a range of countries. They felt that “to facilitate cross-cultural communication it may be useful to provide functional descriptions of a process rather than assuming a shared understanding of terminology” (Offenbacker, Springer, & Sprain, 2009, p. 5). The word 'community' is also a very broad term used to define groups of people, whether they are stakeholders, interest groups, or citizen groups. A community may be a geographic location (community of place), a community of similar interest

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(community of practice), or a community of affiliation or identity (such as an industry or sporting club). The combined terms community and engagement describe a process of diversely defined groups working together. On the State of Victoria’s Department of Sustainability and Environment Website, Introduction to Engagement, the “ linking of the term 'community' to 'engagement' serves to broaden the scope, shifting the focus from the individual to the collective, with the associated implications for inclusiveness to ensure consideration is made of the diversity that exists within any community”. Research has shown that utilising a community engagement approach prior to a disaster as an effective way • 17 •

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to facilitate and implement resiliencybuilding activities with community members in a neighbourhood context (Norris et al., 2007). This involves a range of different types of participation including the involvement of members of the community in planning preparedness strategies for their community in response to a disaster (Patterson, Weil, & Patel, 2009; Skanavis, Koumouris, & Petreniti, 2005). Using an engagement approach that builds on existing community knowledge and that creates a sense of ownership in the community can result in communities that are more resilient and prepared for disasters and are able to recover more quickly from disasters (Jessamay & Turner, 2003; Norris & Stevens, 2007; Norris et al., 2007). This process can have the additional value of increasing the skills of members of the community and ensuring knowledge stays in the community, with community members themselves building capacity (Spee, 2008). Community engagement is identified as an important component in achieving improved psychosocial recovery for individuals and groups post-disaster (Attree et al., 2011). The use of a range of engagement approaches between agencies and communities ensures that information flows out to the local public, and that communities are able to provide feedback, are listened to, and are active participants in their recovery, providing them with a sense of purpose and control over their situation (Morrow, 1999). Effective community engagement also assists in creating a relationship of trust between agency representatives and members of affected locations (Goodman et al., 1998). Feeling included in decisionmaking, being listened to, and having information are key elements to improving individual and community well-being (Paton, 2008). The benefits for agencies are actions that are potentially more effective, sustainable and appropriate (Paton, 2008). These are also more likely to be supported by the communities they are intended to help. The more people are informed, are involved in the decision making process, and feel valued and contribute in meaningful ways, the • 18 •

better their recovery and the recovery of their communities (Tierney, 2009). There is a limited body of literature that focuses on community engagement models used in the response and recovery phases of a disaster. However, there are a number of ways of organising and discussing public participation. One of the earliest models of public participation in government decision-making processes was Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation. This model characterised the various interactions between citizens and government. Many of the subsequent methods of organising participation stem from and complement this original model. For example, Pretty and Hine (1999) have developed a typology of ‘participation’ to differentiate actions according to the level of power that agencies wish to devolve to participants in determining outcomes and actions. More recently, the IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum (Inform-Consult-Involve-CollaborateEmpower) is referred to as a comprehensive approach to participatory actions. Other tools and techniques that can actively include community contributions to promote a community engagement process include Asset Based Community Development and Participatory Appraisal approaches (Israel, Checkoway, Schulz, & Zimmerman, 1994). All of these models identify a range of differing types of participation. In a recovery environment, it is essential that a range of methods is used due to the complexity of the recovery environment, making it difficult but important to involve communities. A wide range of participation methods are more likely to increase the number of people engaging with the decision making processes. This can range from public hearings, citizen advisory committees to emergent citizen groups (Skanavis et al., 2005; Rich, Edelstein, Hallman, & Wandersman, 1995). However, it is just as important to know which of these ‘tools’ to use and how to use them at the most appropriate times.

Engagement strategies that use an interactive, participatory approach to a disaster context are more likely to facilitate a community-led approach to recovery, enquire about pre-event community dynamics, map existing social structures, identify existing strengths and ways of communicating and use these as the foundations for engagement and community building moving forward (Landau & Saul, 2004; Morrow, 1999; Rich et al., 1995; Patterson et al., 2009; Skanavis et al., 2005). It is important to recognise that often these types of interventions require ‘outside’ encouragement and support, and, in most cases, facilitation (Landau & Saul, 2004). Laverack and Labonte (2000) propose a framework that identifies and offers a pathway to accommodate community empowerment goals with more traditional top-down approaches using participatory strategies. There is an inherent power imbalance in the dynamics of disaster response and recovery (Waugh & Streib, 2006). Actions of control and decision-making are crucial, especially in the initial response; people need to see decisions being made and services provided to meet their basic needs of safety, food and shelter. It is also important to achieve a balance with affected communities being actively involved in their recovery as well as receiving support from services (Maton, 2008). Instead, the focus of the recovery process is often about efficiency of actions. It is common for the government officials appointed to recovery structures to work from a client delivery model, where people are viewed as ‘needing’ to be helped, perpetuating a disenabling environment where citizens are covertly encouraged to remain passive clients of government (Vigoda, 2002). This can be exacerbated by policymakers who adopt the top-down style so completely that it takes considerable persuasion to get them to re-orientate their focus back to the normal policy procedures of consulting all involved (Rosenthal et al., 1994). Consequently, the public may lack sufficient freedom of voice and influence (Boin, 2008; Landau & Saul, 2004). Engagement processes need to

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be designed and facilitated in a way that recognises this tension between the pressure on government to assume control versus the imperative to create opportunities for authentic community engagement in the recovery. Empowerment is a complex term that must be clearly defined (Rich et al., 1995). It is often taken to mean any action that provides a community with the final decision-making power (IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum), and, as illustrated by Israel et al. (1994), empowerment can refer to an individual level construct or a multilevel community concept. It can assume the ‘granting’ of power or permission, or it can be used to describe the enabling of others to strengthen skills and resources to gain power over their lives. However, it was stated in the Community Engagement Handbook for Local Government in South Australia that, “the only decision making power which is placed in the hands of the public is that of electing Council Members every 4 years … delegations for decision making cannot be made to the public” (Chappell, 2008, p. 1). Engagement in the Handbook was defined as, “providing opportunities and resources for communities to contribute to solutions by valuing local talents and skills and acknowledging their capacity to be decision makers in their own lives”, and not in the decision-making process of Local Government (Chappell, 2008, p. 2). Marti-Costa and Serrano-Garcia (cited in Goodman et al., 1998) note, though, that grassroots participation is a key aspect for defining and resolving needs, otherwise community empowerment is not possible and needs assessments can become a process of social control. If empowerment is truly the objective, it is important for resources and support to be provided to communities in order to enable them to develop processes and systems to respond to and contribute to the formal and informal recovery processes. These resources must also be flexible in nature: funding opportunities that have tight rules of use can be unhelpful and counterproductive to achieving a state

of empowerment (Arnstein, 1969; Porter, Smyth, & Sweetman, 1999). The recovery environment adds an additional dimension to community participation and engagement planning and activity. Individuals and communities that are affected by a disaster are likely to experience states of stress, distress and disorganisation to various degrees, sometimes extreme (Gordon, 2008; Spee, 2008). While empowerment is a desired stage for a community to achieve in disaster recovery, the ability for members of a community to respond at any particular moment in time needs to be understood and acknowledged (Ward, Becker, & Johnston, 2008). There can be challenges and unrealistic expectations in getting communities to participate in complex decisionmaking in times of stress immediately after a disaster event. “This may be alleviated by ensuring that communities are participating in similar participatory decision-making processes prior to an event, so that the process and structure is familiar to them, thus putting them in a more recognisable and less stressful environment after a disaster” (Johnston, Becker, & Paton, in press). Whilst many people suffer trauma, stress, and related conditions, it is also clear that many people rise up and embrace new opportunities to build and restore their communities (Solnit, 2009). Hence, there is an imperative to facilitate and foster community involvement in the recovery process; and highlights the importance of recovery structures that are inclusive and understanding of the community’s well-being throughout the recovery phases, and recognises that this wellbeing may not necessarily increase uniformly over time. This article draws upon two case studies that describe engagement activities in communities post disaster. The principle methods of data collection for this study were semistructured interviews that were undertaken in 2006 with key agencies and individuals involved in the response to the Matata event, formal and informal feedback from key agencies and individuals involved in the Darfield event, observations from the field, and comprehensive analysis

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of papers, reports and articles. A systematic content analysis of the themes arising from this material was undertaken. This article is written from a Western values position and influenced by the principles of community psychology. Thus, the terminology used may not translate across cultures or professional disciplines. Case Study 1: Matata Flooding and Debris Flow Matata is a small coastal community based in the Bay of Plenty, New Zealand. It has a population of approximately 800 people with a low socio-economic deprivation index of 9 1. The community is 30 minutes travel by car to the nearest town (Whakatane) and has limited access to most services. On 18 May 2005, a band of extremely heavy rain passed over the catchments behind the community of Matata. During a 90minute period, 124 millimetres rainfall was recorded. A total of 300 mm rainfall was recorded over a 24-hour period. This created a flood event estimated to occur on average about once every 100-1000 years (Davies, 2005). The flooding also triggered a significant debris flow with boulders up to 7 metres high travelling through the region. This resulted in major damage to the township of Matata and flooding in surrounding areas. Approximately 750,000 cubic metres of debris was deposited in and around Matata, resulting in the evacuation of 538 people, the destruction of 27 homes, and damage to a further 87 properties (Spee, 2008). Remarkably, no one was killed or injured. A formal response and recovery structure was established, contributed to by central government agencies, local government, and support agencies. An evacuation centre was

1

The New Zealand Deprivation Index ranks areas from 1-10 with 10 being the highest level of deprivation.

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established and people were bussed out to the nearby town of Whakatane. Support services established a ‘onestop shop’ in the Matata Community Resource Centre for approximately one month after the disaster. The recovery focus moving forward was mainly on the physical rebuild of the town with little emphasis on the psychosocial needs of the people and community. The first author’s involvement began in September 2006 at the request of the Whakatane District Council (Council). I was then employed as the Bay of Plenty Social Development Manager for the Ministry of Social Development. Despite on-going community consultation, 16 months on from the event, the relationship between the Council and the community was difficult and strained. In the first instance, conversations were held with key staff at the Council and members of the Matata community. These conversations highlighted issues with engagement and participation. People in the community felt unheard through the on-going mitigation process. The mitigation works comprised five regeneration projects involving physical work to “protect the community from future debris flows” (Whakatane District Council, 2010). Council staff, while running community meetings, felt the community was not ‘hearing’ or understanding what they were saying. It was agreed that a community information day should be held with displays of the proposed mitigation works and having people on hand to answer technical questions. In addition to the displays, a questionnaire was developed to gauge the usefulness of the information day, to gauge the wellbeing of the people, and to determine their interest in working together moving forward. The questionnaire was optional and people could complete it themselves or work with an interviewer. Fifty-five people completed the questionnaire. People indicated that there was value in the information day. However, the most significant findings from the questionnaires were • 20 •

of people feeling isolated and forgotten, increased levels of stress and anxiety, and property and financial concerns. Of the 45 people who answered the question about community action, 42 indicated they were interested in increasing social activity and rebuilding a sense of community. The Matata Community Resource Centre was identified as a key social hub in the community. It offered community members access to computers and the Internet, a space to meet and chat, and somewhere community groups could use to run meetings and events. Funding enabled a colleague, a community psychologist, to be employed parttime based in the Matata Community Resource Centre to assist with further planning. Contact was made with key people who were active in the community and had played a significant role in the disaster response and recovery work, and were invited to contribute to the development of the initial work programme. This was loosely designed to include a focus on individuals, families and the community. Community planning Invitations were sent to all the community groups in Matata that were able to be identified, inviting them to send a representative to a meeting about community planning. Attendees at the meeting were asked if they would like to be involved in community planning activity and to share this invitation with the members of the groups they represented. It was agreed that there was merit in working together to create a community profile and plan. This group formed the basis of a community organising committee that met regularly. The facilitation of the committee meetings was initially shared by my colleague and me. Our role was to provide guidance and to work with committee members to develop their skills and tools to assist the process. Two surveys were developed. The first was based on the principles of Asset Based Community Development and focused on gathering data about existing skills and interests of

members in the community. This then informed the second survey that asked people to look forward and describe what they wanted their community to be like in the future and to choose activities they would support. The committee shared responsibility for the construction, distribution and analysis of both surveys. Marti-Costa and Serrano-Garcia (cited inGoodman et al., 1998) identify that grassroots participation is key in defining and resolving needs, otherwise community empowerment is not possible and needs assessments can become a process of social control. A community planning day was also organised where 70 residents provided their recollections of the history of the town, their assessment of the town’s current state, and ideas on how they wanted their community to look in the future. The inclusion of the historical data was based on Goodman et al.’s (1998) suggestion that it is important to understand how a community interprets its history as this may influence their willingness to become involved in change processes that affect their future. The data from these activities, supported by on-going conversations with community members, provided the information to develop a draft community plan. This was made widely available for people’s comment. However, people did not wait for the plan to be finalised and moved ahead, organising activities that were identified in the draft plan. The process of developing the plan was as valuable, if not more so, as the actual plan. The process brought community together with a focus on a positive future that they had defined and were responsible for. In addition to this process, the group discussed how the relationship with the Council could be improved. People identified two key concerns. The first of these was that people in the community were sharing conflicting information about Council decisions on land use and the mitigation projects. This was adding to the distress of individuals and maintaining the fractures in the social fabric of the community that occurred after the disaster (Gordon, 2008). It was decided to trial a ‘myth busting’ sheet where people could submit

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questions to Council with the response to the questions published in the recovery newsletter. The recovery newsletter published by the Council was regarded as useful by community members. They wanted it to continue but to shift the focus to include more information about community activities and to profile community members. The Council agreed to both of these requests. The newsletter is still being published at the time of writing (August 2011) with a shared focus on recovery and community development. Personal stories Community narratives and the process of gathering these have been shown to be empowering and a way to develop shared meaning and purpose (Norris & Stevens, 2007; Saul & Landau, 2004). Thus, one other key area of work involved collecting narratives or stories from individuals and families about the disaster. Some people chose to write these themselves while others worked with an interviewer. The stories provide a rich recollection of the events on the night and an opportunity for people to reflect on how things were for them now. People were offered support by referral to specialised services through this activity if they indicated they were not coping. During the interviews the participants were also asked to indicate where they were on the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (Cantril, 1965). The top rung indicated feeling extremely satisfied and the bottom rung extremely dissatisfied. The findings showed that generally people were satisfied with their lives before the disaster, they were dissatisfied soon after the disaster, and extremely dissatisfied or placed themselves off the ladder one year later. At the time of the interviews, most people placed themselves at a midpoint on the ladder. Matata six years on The intention was to continue to work with the community, to find a publisher for the residents’ stories and to provide support with the implementation of the plan and

community events. However, this was not possible as on-going funding was not available to continue the employment of my colleague and changes in my work plan minimised my on-going involvement in the community. Eighteen months on from the disaster, the community of Matata was still struggling with its recovery. While the actions of agencies in the immediate response phase was well coordinated, the on-going, longer-term recovery of the community was neither acknowledged nor planned for beyond the physical infrastructure works. Six years later, the Matata community is still rebuilding in both the physical and emotional sense. The community has continued to organise community events and activities and the Council continues to engage with residents as the physical rebuild continues. A collection of events and accounts was published by the Council in 2010 that reflects on the disaster event and current views in the community. Not all communities are able to mobilise and influence the agencies that provide services and develop recovery plans in a disaster. At the time of the Matata disaster, agencies lacked awareness of the need to develop a recovery structure that included community members and planned for recovery many years into the future from the disaster. This disaster highlighted the potential importance of using a range of engagement tools that involve community in its recovery. It also provided an opportunity to reflect on how well Government agencies responded to the community in the immediate phase and longer term. Conversations and planning at a Government agency level began to identify who was responsible for particular roles and actions in a disaster. This planning provided the basis to again mobilise the Government response to a more recent natural disaster in New Zealand. Case Study Earthquake

2:

Darfield

The second case study focuses on the Darfield earthquake. This was a 7.1 magnitude earthquake felt in

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Canterbury, New Zealand, in the early hours of 4th September 2010. This was to be the first of many earthquakes and aftershocks experienced by the region in the following months. Considering the intensity of the Darfield earthquake, it was surprising that there was no loss of life and only a small number of serious injuries. This was attributed to the time of the event (4.36 am) when most people were in bed. However, the earthquake did cause considerable damage to homes, buildings, land and essential services such as power, phone lines, water and sewage. The impacts were fairly localised to a number of communities in Christchurch City and the Kaiapoi, Pines Beach and Kairaki Beach communities of the Waimakariri District, and surrounding rural areas. These communities were significantly affected with either homes ‘red stickered’ as uninhabitable, or habitable but needing significant repairs to the house and land. Badly affected streets in both districts were emptied of residents or only had a few families still living in them. The earthquake also caused disruptions to social and economic activity with community buildings, schools and buildings in the business sector unfit for use. Recovery structure This was the first significant, large-scale disaster in recent years in New Zealand. A formal recovery structure was quickly established, calling on a number of people who had some or no experience in managing such a significant disaster. Management groups were formed, including a Welfare group. This group was comprised of a number of agency, local government and NGO representatives. The responsibility for facilitating the psychosocial recovery lay with this group with links to other groups such as the economic group. Coordination was a primary function of the group; i.e., managing the need for social support with the available services. Initial actions included the development of a psychosocial subgroup and the development of a strategy to inform actions. A communications response was established with a range of information developed and distributed • 21 •

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including factsheets on self-care, access to support services and, financial support, and how to respond to children’s fears and anxieties. A multimedia project informing people about the on-going aftershocks was also developed. Community engagement Communication providing residents with information was initially limited to mass media campaigns, televised updates from officials, print documents, radio messages and website information. These forms of communication reflect the lower end of participation (Inform) on the IAP2 spectrum. While public meetings were being held, these were mainly being organised by elected officials, often using a ‘typical’ public meeting format; i.e., people standing in front of an audience delivering messages and taking questions from the floor. As the weeks rolled past, these meetings evolved in form and became a space for residents to voice their concerns and frustrations. The responsibility for leading community engagement was assigned to local government, specifically to the councils concerned. In the first few months, there were no clear plans apparent to include residents in decision-making processes, let alone fostering an empowering environment as described by Arnstein’s ladder of participation (1969). This could be attributed to a number of factors, including the continuation of command and control type behaviours that were operating in the initial response phase and the lack of emergency management experience of those leading the response. Frustrations were being voiced not only from residents but also the business sector about the lack of information and perceived lack of transparency in decision-making. Emergent community groups were formed and initiated contact with Councils and agencies with requests for information and participation in the recovery processes. In response to residents’ frustrations, the local Councils began to plan meetings to engage with those living in the more damaged areas. This process was complex. Many residents had moved

• 22 •

from their homes and, due to confidentiality issues, personal details were not available to enable people to be contacted directly. Due to the numbers of residents affected and a desire for a meeting structure that offered a more interactive experience, invitations were limited to two people per household in the most damaged areas of Christchurch and the Waimakariri District. However, this rule was not enforced. Advertisements promoting the meetings in the Christchurch district were placed in newspapers. Residents were asked to phone a Freephone number and register to provide an indication of numbers attending. Meetings were held in local venues in different suburbs on different nights. In one case, this resulted in a tight fit in the local community hall. In the Waimakariri District, all the meetings were held in the Kaiapoi High School gymnasium. This meeting format was not used in the Selwyn District as they chose to develop their own engagement process, which involved community meetings run under a different format. The same meeting format was used in both the Waimakariri District and Christchurch City. The intention of the meeting format was to provide a ‘listening space’ with a focus on feedback and to create a sense of mutual support through facilitated small group work. Residents were initially welcomed to the meeting and then asked to move their chairs to form groups of approximately 10 – 15 around pre-established stations. Each station had a facilitator and scribe with large sheets of paper headed with set themes for people to put forward their key questions. There was also an open question of ‘what haven’t we covered?’ when the theme areas did not fit the participants’ questions. People were asked for ideas about staying in contact with agencies and staying in contact as a community. Once questions had been recorded each group was asked to vote for the top three questions for each theme to be answered on the night. The sheets were collated with the other groups and the top three questions for each theme transferred to a computer

slideshow presentation. Later in the evening, agency and business representatives were asked to provide answers to these questions. The questions that did not make it to the computer slideshow presentation were later collated by each of the Councils and published in a booklet form and on the Council’s websites with answers as they were made available. On the IAP2 Public Participation Spectrum this level of engagement relates to the lower levels of ‘consulting and involving’, residents feedback was not guaranteed to influence the decisions that were being made by recovery managers. However, feedback from facilitators and residents indicated that the meetings were well received and provided value (Table 1). In addition to the residents’ meeting, a service provider workshop was organised for the Waimakariri District and held in the township of Kaiapoi. Agency representatives were asked to participate in a number of activities, including identifying community leaders or networkers in the community, their agency’s focus of service delivery, and priority of vulnerable groups. They were also asked to form working groups to develop actions to support the priority groups and the broader community. The actions support the process of building community capacity through leadership and participation (Goodman et al., 1998). On-going meetings were proposed in both Council areas, but unfortunately these did not take place before the Region was struck by another devastating earthquake in February 2011. The effects of this earthquake were mainly centred in Christchurch City and far more significant with loss of life and the closure of the Central Business District. This delayed the proposed processes for Kaiapoi-Pines BeachKairaki Beach and returned Christchurch City to a state of National Emergency with a focus on initial response and then months of on-going recovery efforts.

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Facilitator’s feedback

Residents’ feedback

General process was good - nice balance of 'talking heads', small group work (with use of individual 'votes') and large group discussion (people seemed to like this meeting format - face to face format is so important as some people have noted.)

This was the best community meeting that we've ever been to.

The energy was positive. There were rounds of applause at the end!

I was at the earthquake meeting last night and I would like to thank you and the council staff that were there very much. I found it very constructive and I know everyone really appreciated that you and the other staff were prepared to spend their evenings helping.

At the start of the meetings people seemed a little on edge, frustrated, closed off. But by the end they were relaxed, no longer agitated, and even enjoying small moments of humour, and openly saying positive things about the meeting. People stayed at the end to chat with agency staff and also with each other. People really appreciated being listened to at 'their place' - but this needs to be the beginning of a longer process (feedback from a participant).

I loved this meeting style much better than the other one (i.e. one with large audience and questions from floor) - after which people left and they were still frustrated.

I felt I needed to drop you a line and give you my thoughts on what an outstanding job I think you and your team are doing. While some of the information we thought we were going to get was not forthcoming, the reasons for this were made clear. You showed what a vast amount of hard work has been going on behind the scenes and gave us some insight into our pathway forward.

They liked the 'face to face' aspect and the overall impression I gained was that above all else, they want a personal level of communication whether it is written or in person. Communication was the key!  Table 1. Facilitators’ and residents’ feedback from the resident meetings held in November and December, 2010, in Canterbury Summary The response to the Darfield earthquake again highlights the importance of using a range of engagement strategies to meet the complex needs of communities in a recovery environment. There were tensions between agencies and communities on how engagement should take place, what it constituted and the appropriate level of community participation. While this case study recounts the actions that were eventually put in place, the willingness of the councils to engage and develop a relationship with their communities differed in both Districts. There were on-going challenges to the

development of a comprehensive engagement plan that included community in Christchurch City. While emergent groups formed in both Districts and began to lobby for inclusion and influence in the recovery process, this was only beginning to be realised in the Waimakariri District, where more proactive and inclusive efforts were championed by Council staff. Discussion Both of these case studies highlight the complex and contested nature of engaging communities actively in the recovery process as a mechanism to promote individual, family and community recovery. They also serve to raise awareness of the importance of using a range of strategies to empower communities in post-disaster recovery. As noted by

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Norris et al., (2007, p. 128) “post disaster community health depends in part on the effectiveness of organisational responses” as well as community engagement. The onus is on agencies and organisations to provide vital information, to listen and encourage active participation in decision-making, and to support communities to create their own recovery plans. Recovery is a complex process, with tension-provoking political and economic challenges, diverse leadership styles, and a mixed level of awareness of effective ways to engage with communities and to acknowledge community contributions. It is important to work in a way that supports a community’s ability to understand and manage complex information and to actively shape its own recovery. The use of the terms ‘engagement’ and ‘participation’ must be clarified for all of the stakeholders in the recovery process. Community engagement is more than Government agencies providing information to people, holding community meetings or inviting the public to comment on draft documents such as strategies or recovery plans. It is unlikely that Government can ‘do recovery’ on behalf of the community. It is imperative for Government (at various levels) to create meaningful opportunities for communities to determine their own recovery destiny through inclusive and collaborative recovery planning, decision-making and implementation thus facilitating resilience to withstand future events such as earthquakes. References Arnstein, S. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Planning Association, 35, 216 -224. Attree, P., French, B., Milton, B., Povall, S., Whitehead, M., & Popay, J. (2011). The experience of community engagement for individuals: a rapid review of evidence. Health & Social Care in the Community, 19, 250-260. Boin, A. (2008). Crisis management. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

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Community Engagement Post-Disater: Case Studies Cantril, H. (1965). The pattern of human concerns. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

& M. McGoldrick (Eds.), Living beyond loss (pp. 285–309). New York: Norton.

Chappell, B. (2008). Community engagement handbook. A model framework for leading practice in local government in South Australia. Retrieved from www.lga.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/f iles/Community_Engagement_Handbo ok.doc

Laverack, G., & Labonte, R. (2000). A planning framework for community empowerment goals within health promotion. Health Policy and Planning, 15, 255–62.

Davies, T. (2005). Debris flow emergency at Matata, New Zealand 2005: Inevitable events, predictable disasters. Report for the Department of Geological Services, University of Canterbury, NZ. Goodman, R. M., Speers, M. A., Mcleroy, K., Fawcett, S., Kegler, M., Parker, E., Smith, S. R., et al. (1998). Identifying and defining the dimensions of community capacity to provide a basis for measurement. Health Education & Behavior, 25, 258 -278.

Maton, K. (1988). Social support, organisational characteristics, psychological well-being, and group appraisal in three self-help group populations. American Journal of Community Psychology, 16, 53-77.

Morrow, B. H. (1999). Identifying and mapping community vulnerability. Disasters, 23, 1–18.

Skanavis, C., Koumouris, G., & Petreniti, V. (2005). Public participation mechanisms in environmental disasters. Environmental Management, 35, 821837.

Hudson, J., & Bruckman, A. (2004). The bystander effect: A lens for understanding patterns of participation. The Journal of Learning Sciences, 13, 165-195.

Norris, H., Stevens, S., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K. F., & Pfefferbaum, R. L. (2007). Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for disaster readiness. American Journal of Community Psychology, 41, 127-150.

Johnston, D., Becker, J., & Paton, D. (in press). Multi-agency community engagement during disaster recovery: Lessons from two New Zealand earthquake events. Disaster Prevention and Management. Landau, J., & Saul, J. (2004). Facilitating family and community resilience in response to major disaster. In F. Walsh

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Rich, R., Edelstein, M., Hallman, W., & Wandersman, A. (1995). Citizen participation and empowerment: The case of local environment hazards. American Journal of Community Psychology, 23, 657-676. Rosenthal, U., Boin, A., & Comfort, L., (Eds.) (2001). Managing crisis: Threats, dilemmas, opportunities. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.

Norris, F. H., & Stevens, S. P. (2007). Community resilience and the principles of mass trauma intervention. Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes, 70, 320–328.

Jessamy, V. R., & Turner, R. K. (2003). Modelling community response and perception to natural hazards: lessons learnt from Hurricane Lenny 1999. Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment CSERGE, Working Paper EDM 03, 6.

Offenbacker, B., Springer, S., & Sprain, L. (2009). Painting the landscape: A cross-cultural exploration of publicgovernment decision making. Preliminary Findings Report, IAP2Kettering Research Project, Thornton, CO.

Maton, K. I. (2008). Empowering community settings: agents of individual development, community betterment, and positive social change. American Journal of Community Psychology, 41, 4-21.

Gordon, R. (2008). A “social biopsy” of social process and personal responses in recovery from natural disaster. GNS Science Report 2008/09, Wellington, NZ.

Israel, B. A., Checkoway, B., Schulz, A., & Zimmerman, M. (1994). Health education and community empowerment: Conceptualizing and measuring perceptions of individual, organisational, and community control. Health Education & Behavior, 21, 149170.

www.essex.ac.uk/ces/esu/communityparticipatory.shtm

Paton, D. (2008). Risk communication and natural hazard mitigation: how trust influences its effectiveness. International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, 8, 2–16. Patterson, O., Weil, F., & Patel, K. (2009). The role of community in disaster response: Conceptual models. Population Research and Policy Review, 29, 127-141. Porter, F., Smyth, I. A., & Sweetman, C. (1999). Gender works: Oxfam experience in policy and practice. Oxford, UK: Oxfam Publications. Pretty, J. (1998). Furthering cooperation between people and institutions. Advances in Geoecology, 31, 837–850. Pretty, J., & Hine, R. (1999). Participatory appraisal for community assessment, retrieved from

Son, J., & Lin, N. (2008). Social capital and civic action: A network-based approach. Social Science Research, 37, 330–349. Solnit, R. (2009). A paradise built in hell: The extraordinary communities that arise in disaster. New York: Viking. Spee, K. (2008).Community recovery after the 2005 Matata disaster: long-term psychological and social impacts. GNS Science Report 2008/12, Wellington, NZ State of Victoria’s Department of Sustainability and Environment Website, Introduction to Engagement. Downloaded from http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/effectiveengagement/introduction-toengagement/what-is-communityengagement Tierney, K. (2009). Disaster response: Research findings and their implications for resilience measures. CARRI Research Report 6, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA. Vigoda, E. (2002). From responsiveness to collaboration: Governance, citizens, and the next generation of public administration. Public Administration Review, 62, 527–540. Ward, J., Becker, J., & Johnston, D. (2008). Community participation in

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Collins, Glavovic, Johal, & Johnston recovery planning - A case study from the 1998 Ohura flood, GNS Science Report 2008/22, Wellington, NZ

personal accounts. Whakatane, NZ: Author.

Sarb Johal, PhD, is a Research Associate in the School of Psychology.

Author’s note: Waugh, W. L., & Streib, G. (2006). Collaboration and leadership for effective emergency management. Public Administration Review, 66, 131140.

Professor Bruce Glavovic, School of People, Environment and Planning, is the Associate Director of JCDR and holds the EQC Chair in Natural Hazards Planning.

Whakatane District Council (2010). Matata 5 Years On 18 May 2005 to 2010. A snapshot of events and

Professor David Johnston is the Director of JCDR. For further information contact Susan Collins, at [email protected].

 Basilica of the Blessed Sacrament, with damage ‘containered’, September 2011 — ©2011 Ross Becker

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Psychosocial Recovery from Disasters: A Framework Informed by Evidence Maureen F. Mooney, Joint Centre for Disaster Research Douglas Paton, University of Tasmania Ian de Terte, Massey University Sarb Johal, Joint Centre for Disaster Research A. Nuray Karanci, Middle East Technical University, Turkey Dianne Gardner, Massey University Susan Collins, Joint Centre for Disaster Research Bruce Glavovic, Joint Centre for Disaster Research Thomas J. Huggins, Joint Centre for Disaster Research Lucy Johnston, Canterbury University Ron Chambers, Canterbury District Health Board David Johnston, Joint Centre for Disaster Research

Following the Canterbury earthquakes, The Joint Centre for Disaster Research (JCDR), a Massey University and Geological and Nuclear Science (GNS Science) collaboration, formed a Psychosocial Recovery Advisory Group to help support organisations involved in the recovery process. This advisory group reviews and summarises evidence-based research findings for those who make requests for such information. Extensive experience within the group adds a practitioner perspective to this advice. This article discusses the definition of psychosocial recovery used by the group to date, and the group’s view that psychosocial recovery involves easing psychological difficulties for individuals, families/whānau and communities, as well as building and bolstering social and psychological well-being. The authors draw on a brief discussion of this literature to make practical suggestions for psychosocial recovery.

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Mooney et al.

The earthquakes in Canterbury during 2010 and 2011 have created unprecedented demands on agencies tasked with disaster recovery. An earthquake sequence of this nature and extent in Canterbury was unanticipated, and the multiple agencies involved needed to rapidly coordinate their response and recovery planning. The earthquake in Canterbury on 22 February 2011 highlighted an acute need to garner a breadth of New Zealand and international disaster recovery expertise to help inform the many facets of a rapidly developing recovery context. The Joint Centre for Disaster Research (JCDR) is a collaboration between Massey University and GNS Science. Acting on a request from the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), JCDR rapidly formed an advisory group of specialists with experience researching and working in psychosocial recovery from disasters (see Appendix). The advisory group represents a range of diverse specialties and experience based around the discipline of psychology. The group’s expertise has been applied to providing a range of advice to key agencies involved after the earthquakes in Canterbury. In addition to drawing on extended professional experience in the psychosocial field, the advisory group has based their advice on empirical evidence to provide timely but quality advice. This evidence highlights the need to provide many levels of intervention, ranging from the general provision of basic living requirements to specialised interventions for a small proportion of the population suffering from the impact of individual trauma and related difficulties. All advice focussed on a psychosocial approach to post-disaster recovery. This approach to recovery aims to ease physical and psychological difficulties for individuals, families/whānau and communities, as well as building and bolstering social and psychological well-being (Ministry of Health, 2007). This entails addressing vulnerabilities as well as looking for and enhancing

the strengths of affected individuals and communities. The broad nature of psychosocial recovery goals demands collaboration between an extensive range of professionals such as psychologists, sociologists, economists and urban designers. The group’s own working definition of psychosocial recovery is set out in an annex to our terms of reference and is discussed within the current article. The definition was written to focus the efforts of our advisory group, and does not claim to encompass all potential aspects of psychosocial recovery. The definition does include aspects of mental health needs and psychological support, alongside communities’ capacity to respond and adapt in the face of adversity. The group’s definition of psychosocial recovery also focuses on the importance of community participation and engagement within recovery governance. Such participation and engagement has important effects on a population’s recovery, resilience, and adaptive capacity. Although it is tempting to regard ‘recovery’ as a simple process, some consideration needs to be given to the intended meaning of this term and other language used around it. The term recovery is often embedded in a model of repair and restoration to a pre-injury or pre-illness state. Accordingly, individuals may consider that successful recovery is achieved only if they return to how they were prior to the disaster (i.e., ‘returning to normal’). This interpretation of recovery is neither possible nor desirable after a major disaster, and so it is useful for agencies to clarify their intended use of the term ‘recovery’. This will help agencies to focus the attention of individuals and society on coping positively with a disaster, progressing toward a situation that has psychosocially and physically changed, rather than focusing on trying to return to a pre-earthquake state. Advisory group collaborations have highlighted practical components of a strength-based approach to recovery. These components include assisting goal setting and problem-

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solving, social support, appreciating cultural and spiritual practices and community diversity, and the importance of coordination and integration. This advisory group’s role is ongoing, as part of providing for these components. We hope to remain engaged with the Canterbury recovery through further advice and the considered design of collaborative research projects. Our advisory group also hopes to advocate for the resourcing of integrated monitoring and evaluation, which, like other aspects of longer-term planning, could be easily neglected within the ongoing challenges of recovery in the Canterbury region. Characteristics Psychosocial Advisory Group

of

Our Recovery

The diversity of experience and knowledge within the group is both an advantage and a challenge. This group’s diverse knowledge of psychosocial recovery is essential as, this is a complex area. Having a group capable of marshalling a wider breadth of evidence-based information is a distinct advantage to practitioners and policy-makers in the broader psychosocial recovery domain. The advisory group can take advantage of extensive international links and involvement in other disasters both within and outside New Zealand, to inform best practice in recovery from the Canterbury earthquakes. The group has focused on maintaining an ability to co-operate and collaborate effectively, building strength from the diversity of member backgrounds and approaches. A recovery process is a vast activity where different perspectives and conflicting needs operate simultaneously. In a disaster recovery situation these conflicting demands and interests can result in the breakdown of effective communication and lead to ineffective dynamics. The advisory group has found a modus vivendi of functioning together to produce documents and support for clients, despite having diverse interests and frameworks. A clear demarcation of roles and processes within the group along with flexibility when responding to

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demands is a factor in developing this efficiency. This example of effective collaboration reflects what efforts can be made in the wider disaster recovery arena. Activities and interventions In a major disaster, recovery processes can be initially overwhelming and can threaten to outstrip resources available to meet this challenge. Often agencies in the field find that so much of their time is taken up with response and recovery efforts that they have little time to examine the empirical evidence base or to analyse whether what they are doing is effective. Many frontline organisations in Canterbury had also to contend with working in makeshift offices and with some staff negatively affected by the disaster. An advisory group which can take time to research and reflect, to take a step back from operations to examine and search for pertinent material, can be a positive element in disaster recovery settings. To date, the group has worked with numerous key agencies including MSD, the Ministry of Education, the Prime Minister’s Chief Science Advisor, and the Christchurch Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA). The group has responded to requests by researching and providing empirical information on specific aspects of psychosocial recovery processes and the style and scope of interventions. Examples of specific advice are detailed in Table 1. Table 1: Examples of Psychosocial Recovery Advisory Group advice given to date.

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Our advisory group can play a positive role in recovery, beyond the initial planning stages. Research can improve knowledge on current situations and refine future approaches. The Canterbury earthquakes disaster has provided a rare, if unwelcome, opportunity to improve and enhance existing knowledge of the recovery process in order to better prepare for any future disaster situations. Members of the advisory group are helping develop relevant research along with Canterbury colleagues. Defining and Promoting Psychosocial Recovery The advisory group collates and summarises a range of empirical material. This has allowed the group to compile an evolving annex to the group’s terms of reference. The psychosocial definition encapsulated by this document envisages recovery as encompassing cultural, psychological, social, economic, and physical (including housing, infrastructure and physical health) dimensions that are part of the regeneration of a community which has experienced adversity. The group’s full terms of reference and annex have been made available to key agencies contributing to psychosocial recovery in Canterbury. The definition provided by the annex has also helped provide the following summary of psychosocial recovery literature. Individual and family recovery When planning for interventions, psychosocial recovery needs to be

considered at the level of individuals, families/whānau and small groups as well as communities. Individual and group needs evolve within the recovery cycle. Different groups and individuals within affected communities can experience the disaster in a range of ways. In addressing the need for psychological support, a range of research findings suggest most of the population will have reactions to a disaster. Evidence reviewed by Bonanno, Brewin, Kaniasty, and La Greca (2010), Hobfoll, Watson, Bell, Bryant, Brymer, Friedman, et al. (2007), and McNally, Bryant, and Ehlers (2003) shows these reactions will settle down and that most people will probably experience a relatively stable pattern of healthy functioning in time, given appropriate resources and support. These resources and supports need to be planned for alongside, and concurrently to, more specialised care. Research from Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004), and Joseph and Linley (2005) have provided evidence that a proportion of the affected population will demonstrate a capacity for post-adversity growth. Initially this group may show stress symptoms and will probably benefit, along with the rest of the population living through a disaster, from basic psychosocial support. Likewise, in some cases they may benefit from more specialised mental health care. A range of intervention levels are detailed in Figure 1. The psychosocial recovery process will need to include general support, more focused psychosocial activities and specialised psychological / psychiatric interventions. While in the immediate aftermath, many of the affected population will need only basic psychosocial support, analysis of comparable events suggests that only a small proportion of the population will need some additional psychosocial intervention through community-led, agency-supported activities designed to meet their unique needs (Bonanno et al., 2010; Bryant, 2007; Galea, Nandi & Vlahov, 2005; Galea, Tracy, Norris & Coffey, 2008; Galea, Vlahov, Resnick, Ahern, & Susser, 2003).

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Figure 1: Pyramid of post-disaster psychosocial needs. Adapted from Psychosocial Interventions by the International Federation Reference Centre for Psychosocial Support, 2009, p. 34. A much smaller proportion of this affected population may eventually need more specialized mental health care (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995; Kornør, Winje, Ekeberg, Weisæth, Kirkehei, Johansen et al., 2008; McNally et al., 2003; National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005). Although some people do show symptoms of Acute Stress Reaction and PostTraumatic Stress, others may have clinical levels of depression, anxiety or behavioural disorders. Some people with pre-existing problems of mental health may find their symptoms exacerbated. Whether directly or indirectly involved, mental health service providers need to be appropriately trained in post-disaster reactions and appropriate evidencebased interventions. Often psychological distress in the affected population becomes evident in the post-immediate phase of the disaster recovery cycle. The recommended attitude of watchful waiting should pick up some of the most vulnerable within the community although a proactive approach to care is often necessary. People may be distressed but still hesitate to consult. ‘Door knocking’ is one example of pro-active outreach, as has been exemplified by local Iwi in the Canterbury area. Another example of outreach is sensitization and basic training on common reactions and ways of coping for local GPs and teachers, who are in the front line of meeting the affected population. Such training should remain mindful that such front-line staff may also be part of the affected population (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2005). It is worth resourcing nonspecialist psychosocial supports such as psychological first aid (PFA) and community facilitators from the immediate response phase onwards. This can help to a) reduce the risk of normal stress reactions evolving into

potentially debilitating reactions; b) identify and assist those needing more specialized support; and c) give added support and human resources to local mental health and psychosocial support structures who may be overwhelmed by demands (Boscarino, Adams, & Figley, 2005; Bryant, 2007; Everly & Flynn, 2006; Jones, Roberts & Greenberg, 2003; Raphael, 1986). Community mapping is another way to identify vulnerable populations, and to focus supportive actions. Although the efficacy of PFA has yet to be extensively examined, several authors have made positive comments about this approach. Raphael (1986, p. 283) states that psychological first aid is: “basic, nonintrusive pragmatic care with a focus on listening but not forcing talk; assessing needs and ensuring that basic needs are met; encouraging but not forcing company from significant others; and protecting from further harm.” Within the Canterbury region, an important effort was made to train local human resources and other providers in PFA. Such training could be provided in anticipation of events to build ready disaster preparedness. As psychological and social consequences for the affected population may be impacted by disruptions to or loss of livelihood, psychosocial support planning can

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benefit from including the assessment of business continuity planning and can advocate for continuity planning to be incorporated into national readiness planning. Getting people back to work can increase their sense of perceived control and so makes a positive contribution to psychosocial recovery (Hobfoll et al., 2007). The value of employment adds to needs for organizational resilience, meaning business continuity planning can have important social and economic implications for psychosocial recovery. In defining who the affected population is, the needs of affected communities and of responders and frontline staff should be taken into consideration. Advisory group members’ experience suggests the needs of those working on the frontline are often not recognised as part of a psychosocial recovery effort until these groups experience marked distress. Early support to frontline personnel can strengthen the recovery effort. Respite, rotation, training, peer support and supervision have been able to increase frontline effectiveness, not only in the immediate response phase, but over the longer course of recovery (Palm, Polusny, & Follette, 2004; Paton, Violanti, Johnston, Burke, Clarke, & Keenan, 2008). Frontline support should be planned from the immediate • 29 •

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to the long term, including psychological supports, ongoing monitoring, and appropriate job design (including respite and back-ups). Regardless of role, each person who works with or comes into contact with people affected by a disaster can influence the recovery and well-being of those they interact with. Those providing services must be appropriately trained, supported and have access to regular supportive supervision, where problems are addressed and individual worker capacity is strengthened and secondary consultation is made as required. Leadership teams also need to be included in such considerations. Supporting adaptation to a changed reality Although the post-disaster recovery has been described within the advisory group as community (re)development under extraordinary pressures, it is anticipated that recovery in the Canterbury region will be a complex process and will occur over many years. At the time of writing, due to on-going major aftershocks, the recovery process is taking place within the context of a chronic stressor that continues to affect the population. Immediate response to individual distress and community disruption is vital. However, the manner in which recovery processes are started and supported in the long term will influence whether positive or negative outcomes are experienced over time and in the long term.

However, a few short definitions help frame resilience as part of a disaster recovery process. Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche and Pfefferbaum (2008) defined resilience as “A process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance” (p.131). Resilience has also been conceptualised more as an ability or process than as an outcome (Brown & Kulig, 1996; Pfefferbaum, DeVoe, Stuber, Schiff, Klein, & Fairbrother, 2005). Paton and Johnston (2001) state that resilience, at a practical level, then involves developing the capacity of people, communities and societies to anticipate, cope with, adapt to and develop from hazard consequences. Most authors include the capacity of individuals to quickly cope, adapt and recommence adaptive functioning as an example of resilience. The holistic nature and complexity of the recovery process can be illustrated by the following diagram, from Paton (in press). A holistic recovery process in the Canterbury situation is one which needs to address diverse reactions, within numerous and varied communities living in a chronic situation of ongoing substantial aftershocks. Interventions and processes of engagement therefore need to be adapted both in place and

over time. Figure 2 draws a distinction between resilience and adaptive capacity. This model advocates for the concept of adaptation within response, recovery and rebuilding. It was developed with the express intent of assessing the degree to which agencies meet needs for community empowerment when dealing with challenging and atypical circumstances (Paton & Johnston, 2006). Paton and Johnston (2006, p. 7-8) discuss how: …resilience is often used in a manner synonymous with the notion of ‘bouncing back’…and implies a capability to return to a previous state. This usage, however, captures neither the reality of disaster experience nor its full implications. Even if people wanted to return to a previous state, changes to the physical, social and psychological reality of societal life emanating from the disaster can make this untenable. That is, the post-disaster reality, irrespective of whether it reflects the direct consequences of disaster or the recovery and rebuilding activities undertaken, will present community members with a new reality that may

The desired outcome of the psychosocial recovery process is to encourage a well-functioning community and to foster individual resilience and well-being. Resilience has numerous definitions and this paper will not attempt a definitive overview of these.  Figure 2: Interaction between hazards, resilience and vulnerability factors influences risk of growth or loss. From Paton, (in press).

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differ in several fundamental ways from that prevailing pre-disaster. It is the changed reality (whether from the disaster itself or the societal reaction to it) that people must adapt to. This suggests management of psychosocial recovery, in the broadest sense, is charged with assisting people to deal with immediate psychosocial problems and practical problems such as longer term housing. Psychosocial recovery will also require facilitating people’s ability to adapt to, assimilate and actively manage their altered present and future demands. A strengths-based approach Historically, the psychosocial needs of individuals and families/whānau have been seen from a vulnerability perspective (i.e., pathology such as post-traumatic stress, anxiety states and depression). A strengths-based approach has been used in social work case management (Saint-Jacques, Turcotte, & Pouliot, 2009). This perspective focuses on concepts of empowerment and resilience, together with viable group and community membership (Saleebey, 1996). Needs or strengths assessment of active local community participation is a challenging but necessary component of recovery efforts. Active community participation and using individuals own capacities and resources can reduce perceptions of having recovery imposed without any consultation process. This strengths-based approach is especially effective if it is accompanied by practical and psychological support and by information about associated health issues including the impacts and effects of and normal reactions to such experiences. Relevant psychosocial education materials and other delivery can include indicators of distress and strategies for managing this, the importance of using existing support networks, and information about how and when to access other services for additional support. Other information could cover: insurance; housing; budget advice; help in becoming an active community group; as well as access to more specialised psychological and health services.

Such information and materials are not helpful when people do not have resources to receive or deal with that information (Hobfoll et al., 2007). When planning for the promotion of positive recovery and reconstruction within the community, it is helpful to identify priorities. The first step is to identify the factors that help or hinder people’s active engagement in their own recovery, in what are highly atypical and challenging circumstances (Boyd, Quevillon, & Engdahl, 2010; Gillard & Paton, 1999; Lyons, Mickelson, Sullivan, & Coyne, 1998; Mishra, Suar, & Paton, 2009; Tugade & Frederickson, 2004). The importance of this activity and the emphasis on enhancing strengths while supporting the vulnerable derives from understanding how people experience a sense of crisis in disaster-affected communities. In general, people’s reaction reflects how event demands (e.g., loss, disruption) interact with personal and community factors that influence people’s capacity to cope with and adapt to challenging circumstances and those that make them more vulnerable to experiencing deficit and pathological outcomes. In looking from the community perspective, strengths and resilience resources can include: social support; spiritual and cultural resources; active coping styles; collective efficacy; community competence; sense of community; place attachment; empowerment and trust (Paton & Jang, 2011). It is these factors, along with individual factors such as problem-solving, hardiness, selfreliance, flexible coping repertoire and self-efficacy, which allow people to deal effectively with most of the challenges they face in everyday life. Research into disaster recovery increasingly suggests that the resources and competencies that people have developed to deal with mainstream problems can assist their natural recovery from disaster (Paton & Jang, 2011). Understanding this relationship provides the foundation for recovery planning designed to promote natural recovery. A state of social and psychological disequilibrium can

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result if the atypical and threatening circumstances in which people find themselves make it difficult for people to apply their existing skills and knowledge to the challenges posed by the post-disaster environment, or even in tackling everyday tasks. Not having the resources, or being unable to effectively draw upon existing skills and knowledge to help combat these challenges can have a negative impact on an individual’s psychological and physical well-being. In answer to limitations outlined by Saleebey (1996), focusing on strengths does not mean ignoring the need to address particular vulnerabilities. Vulnerability factors are an important influence on the likelihood of people experiencing negative outcomes (Boyd et al., 2010; Paton & Johnston, 2001; Raphael, 1986). Factors include learned helplessness, community fragmentation, loss of normal support networks, an uneven distribution of resources prior to the disaster, uneven distribution of disaster impacts, and being displaced from the community. Individual Recovery Empowerment Communities

and within

While psychosocial recovery needs to resource appropriate interventions to address mental distress and possible pathology following a disaster, psychosocial recovery is influenced by more than the availability of psychological supports or mental health services. Although these services and supports are definitely necessary, they are insufficient to meet the diversity of needs in an affected population. Our knowledge of the social determinants of mental health (of the impact of poverty, isolation, former trauma and unemployment) on psychological and social distress reinforces the interdependence of social and psychological factors on the wellbeing of individuals and communities. Seeing individual recovery not as isolated persons, but as individuals within families/whānau and communities has strengthened recovery interventions. Thus, psychosocial recovery is linked to

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community and overall recovery. Evidence detailed by Shinn and Toohey (2003) and Norris et al. (2008) shows that the psychosocial recovery process needs to build an organisational and supportive culture that engages and empowers affected local individuals and their communities. Coupled with individual, group and peer support, psychosocial activities need to be developed and managed in a collaborative manner with the local community to enable psychosocial recovery within an appropriate cultural context. The objectives of recovery intervention are to assist people and communities to regain a sense of control in what are very atypical circumstances; to facilitate people’s ability to return to effective functioning and to assist them to make sense of their experience now and in the future (Boyd et al., 2010; Paton & Johnston, 2001; Raphael, 1986). Crucial to this is communicating with communities in ways that orient people to the reality of the situation in which they find themselves, clarifying what has happened and what is likely to happen in the short, medium and long term, and providing information that helps people to identify their strengths and resources and to use them to take action to assist their and others recovery. Benight and Bandura (2004) and Hobfoll et al. (2007) highlight the importance of active community participation and community empowerment and engagement in all aspects of the recovery time-line. These authors state such empowerment and engagement are necessary for a community’s sustainable recovery and adaptation to change. However, some populations are not accustomed to participating in a recovery effort, and need to be accompanied initially in this activity. Participation is only empowering if voluntary, constructive and resourced (Arnstein, 1969). Hobfoll et al. (2007) and Benight and Bandura (2004) argued that although the person or population have a realistic capacity to react in the circumstances of • 32 •

disaster, it is important to plan participation effectively. If the affected population participates, without the capacity or knowledge of how to actively take part in recovery, that population will be set-up for an additional negative experience. This can compound the feeling of being overwhelmed, and reiterates the need for creating empowered people and empowering settings, as illustrated in Figure 3.

and individual competencies that contribute to people being empowered and able to, for example, identify and represent their needs during the response and recovery phases of disaster (Paton & Tang, 2009). A commitment to creating opportunities for authentic participation in recovery planning and implementation for all has significant resource and timing implications that need to be organised within the structured recovery efforts

Recovery then is sometimes about supporting individuals and groups to be active in their community. This allows individuals to assume some feeling of control over the situation by shared ownership of an intervention and can mean an aspect of recovery is sustained by the population who will continue to live in the area.

The second way requires agencies and institutions to create empowering settings by, for example, being responsive to community strengths and intervening in ways that promote the ability of community members to meet their own needs (Dalton, Elias, & Wandersman, 2007; Fetterman & Wandersman, 2004; Paton, Smith, Daly, & Johnston, 2008).

Besides providing opportunities for community members to participate in the rebuilding process, community participation also increases the likelihood that interventions will meet community needs. Such participation may also offer opportunities to enhance community cohesion and trust which form a significant resilience factor (Bonanno et al., 2010). Existing research by Paton (in press) has identified indicators of empowered people and empowering settings that have been validated for New Zealand populations. It has also identified ways of assessing the quality of inter-dependencies between people and agencies that can inform the assessment of the quality of relationships between people and agencies and service provides in relation to meeting people’s needs. The resilience model (see Figure 3) was developed with the express intent of assessing the degree to which agencies meet people’s needs when dealing with challenging and atypical circumstances. Empowerment literature (including Eng & Parker, 1994; Goodman, Speers, McLeroy, Fawcett, & Parker, 1998) suggests the need to facilitate, as far as possible, community empowerment processes in two ways. The first concerns assessing and/or developing the social

Given the atypical nature of recovery circumstances in which people find themselves, empowerment relies on people operating within empowering settings. The degree to which settings are empowering is a function of the degree to which they are receptive to community needs, expectations and capabilities and operate in ways that meet these needs and facilitate self help and natural recovery (Dalton et al., 2007; Paton et al., 2008). Some Christchurch individuals may not be engaged in their local community and may be unfamiliar with their neighbours. Rather than building on existing community networks, support agencies often need to facilitate the development of new networks, to better disseminate information and aid. In relation to empowering settings, it is imperative that those working in environmental, economic and structural areas acknowledge how their work can facilitate or detract from empowerment required for psychosocial recovery. It is hoped these agencies will consult with the advisory group and other psychosocial responders in this regard, to increase the availability of a holistic recovery process for the people of Canterbury.

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objectives is part of this learning experience. Regaining a sense of control and structure under challenging circumstances provides people with a better foundation for thinking about long term issues and how they might be approached in ways that utilise the strengths and competencies developed in the recovery environment. People’s ability to function under stressful circumstances can be assisted by ensuring that these activities occur in a supportive social and cultural environment. Restoration of a calm environment also aids clear decisionmaking and allows for rehearsal and practice of activities.

Figure 3. Summary of empirical test of resilience / adaptive capacity model. From Paton, (2010) . Figure 3 was developed with the express intent of identifying factors indicative of empowered people and communities facing natural hazard consequences and assessing the degree to which agencies met people’s needs when dealing with challenging and atypical circumstances. Practical Components Strength–Based Recovery

of

The following components are based upon the preceding summary of psychosocial recovery processes. The components are not intended to provide an exhaustive guide to psychosocial recovery planning. However, we hope they will assist planning for more integrative community, family/whānau, and individual recovery from a strengths perspective. Goal setting and problem solving In the atypical and challenging circumstances in which people find themselves in the post-disaster environment, people can benefit from guidance on identifying the problems and issues that are posed by a need to change. This involves identifying how personal and community strengths can be mobilised to facilitate people’s recovery (Paton & Jang, 2011; Paton

& Johnston, 2006). This process also aids recovery by helping people focus on tasks that can be accomplished in the present. Facilitating the development of short-term, realistic and manageable goals can reduce people’s risk of feeling overwhelmed by thinking about the number and magnitude of tasks posed by the losses to their environment, home, and employment. Focusing on short-term goals reduces the anxiety associated with being preoccupied with abstract, vague, long term activities (Trope & Liberman, 2003), instead offering the affected population a sense of control over their immediate environment. If people are to focus on identifying strategies for action, a practical goal is to help develop problem-solving and decision-making skills and to develop the planning skills required to implement strategies in ways consistent with community needs and expectations. This combination of activities helps ensure that individuals and groups put strategies into practice, thus providing a stronger foundation for progressively dealing with the demands posed by the disaster over the medium to long term (Boyd et al., 2010). It is advised that support is given so that overall reflection on how shortterm tasks fit into longer term

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Social support An important intervention goal is to facilitate the development of mutual support within the affected community (Boyd et al., 2010). Considering the potential of social support to help people deal with the challenges they face (Karasek & Theorell, 1990), it is important to develop supportive relationships with other people impacted and those who are responding (i.e., mental health workers and other relief workers). It is therefore imperative that recovery strategies performed by external agencies complement social support practices (Boyd et al., 2010; Paton & Johnston, 2006). An important way of achieving this involves ensuring intervention is consistent with spiritual and cultural practices. If, as in the case of some suburbs and districts in Canterbury, there will be an emergence of a ‘new community’ made up of both residing and newly arriving families and individuals, there will be a need to facilitate the development of mutual support. Spiritual and cultural practices Effective community-based intervention places considerable importance on accommodating spiritual and cultural values and practices within the recovery process (McCombs, 2010). The validity of intervention is likely to be increased by working with community leaders, both pre-existing and emergent after the disaster event, and by accommodating spiritual and cultural expectations. This in turn plays an

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important role in building and maintaining trust between the community and professional agencies (Paton et al., 2008). Understanding and accommodating spiritual practices has implications for needs assessment, planning and design of the intervention, and for monitoring and evaluating interventions. Prominent issues include emphasising the use of rituals and ceremonies within the community context. Community activities may or may not have a religious context and may simply be characterised by customary practices of community members. Providing recovery mechanisms consistent with the spiritual and cultural orientation of the community facilitates people’s ability to impose meaning on their experience, and helps them integrate these meanings into the fabric of their culture and community (Gillard & Paton, 1999; Lyons et al., 1998; McCombs, 2010). This integration provides a foundation for future adaptive capacity and building people’s ability to respond more effectively to future disasters. Community diversity Recovery planning must also accommodate the many ways different groups within affected communities can experience a disaster and thus present with special needs (Boyd et al., 2010; Cherry, Allen & Galea, 2010). Some of these groups are demographic in origin. Specific groups may be more at risk of developing negative consequences, including children, elderly people and people living alone. Other vulnerable groups may be characterised by those with a history of prior trauma, mental illness, chronic illness, and disability. Diversity can also be reflected in people’s event-related experiences (Paton, Millar, & Johnston, 2001). For example, people who are injured, who have lost family/whānau members, homes and livelihood may present with specific needs. Family/whānau members living in different parts of the country and people who might be visiting the area when a disaster struck can also present with distinctive recovery needs which must be carefully assessed and responded to.

• 34 •

Cultural diversity may also represent a different combination of strengths, vulnerabilities and needs among particular groups. In designing a plan for psychosocial recovery, activities should be tailored to reflect the needs expressed from the affected community. The existing research on community adaptive capacity in relation to natural hazards provides an evidence-based foundation for this approach, as outlined in Figure 3 and our earlier summary of surrounding literature. This not only means that the community conveys its own conception of its needs, but that it influences the design of recovery efforts and is involved in its implementation. Spontaneous community activities (e.g., Christchurch’s Student Army) need to be incorporated and can be measured as part of an integrated approach to evaluation. Coordination and integration The services people need are part of an overall service system that must be provided in a coordinated and integrated manner. Without the active collaboration of all involved: local community, government and nongovernment bodies, psychosocial support will be imposed and sustainability minimised. This is a multi–level understanding of psychosocial recovery, in that it can operate both vertically from governance bodies to grassroots groups and vice versa, as well as horizontally through effective collaboration and co-operation between groups. Often, in postdisaster situations, structures need to work together using a cross-cutting approach that differs from their usual, specific-focused interventions. Coordination by one recognised person or body can help this necessary process. Often, in post-disaster needs out-number resources, conflict will arise and a collaborative approach may need to be mediated between parties. Monitoring and evaluation Our advisory group is mindful that the recovery process in Canterbury is ongoing and relatively

iterative. Initial psychosocial initiatives need to evolve with needs, to cover gaps noted by responders and the local population within a recovery planning structure. An ongoing monitoring and evaluation process is necessary to detect needs that are not yet met by the recovery efforts and to determine whether efforts are effective in answering needs. Finding appropriate indicators that signal effectiveness is a slowly growing aspect of psychosocial recovery, but a critical part of organising supports for psychosocial recovery. Some examples of indicators are the reduction in symptoms, a return to daily activities and an increase in designated coping behaviours. It is vital that this ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the recovery process is resourced as part of psychosocial recovery. Later onset distress and ongoing community recovery needs reinforce this necessity for monitoring and assessment procedures to be in place for several months and years following the event (Galea, Tracy, Norris, & Coffey, 2008). For example, symptoms may peak on the anniversary of the adverse events or as a result of future large aftershocks. This necessity arises from the way these figures may vary according to the type and impact of the disaster, the capacities and functioning of the community, the cultural context and our ability to measure within certain scenarios. Sustained assessment can be facilitated using more community/peer-based processes designed to provide long term social support and to provide pathways to more specialised care, if required. For example, community centres can participate in collecting information on the effectiveness of interventions, and ongoing needs for those interventions. Identifying how this assessment can occur is an area that will benefit from additional research. Pre-existing Canterbury research (by Becker, 2010) used variables in Paton’s (2010) resilience model and could be used to provide some baseline indicators.

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Conclusion The present Canterbury situation is marked by continuing after-shocks which impact on the community and delay the access and re-building of the Central Business District and other suburbs. The aftershocks prolong temporary accommodation and limit communication and information on sustainability of some suburbs. Ongoing geological instability continues to disrupt routine daily life and may hinder some recovery processes. Many core assumptions of certainty and predictability have been repeatedly violated. Such repeated events can provoke ongoing anxiety and distress that may influence how people respond. Pre-existing complexities of even the most defined and focused approach to psychosocial recovery have become even more convoluted. The JCDR psychosocial recovery advisory group aims to help inform recovery efforts being planned for this long- term and uniquely challenging context. This advisory group offers a range of experience and expertise, based on the discipline of psychology, to help advise key agencies involved in the Canterbury recovery. The advisory group uses scientific literature to provide timely advice on complex psychosocial recovery topics. To date, this literature has emphasised the need for many levels of intervention, ranging from the general provision of basic living requirements, to community-based supports and specialised interventions for a small proportion of the population. Seeing individual recovery not as isolated persons, but as people within families/whānau and communities strengthens recovery interventions. Individual psychosocial recovery becomes integrally linked to overall community recovery. Evidence shows that the psychosocial recovery process needs to build an organisational and supportive culture that engages and empowers affected local individuals and their communities. Surrounding research literature has impressed the need for a more strengths-based approach to recovery. Rather than referring to disaster-affected populations in terms of unavoidable

deficits, our advisory group promotes the need to consider both strengths and vulnerabilities, when working to support adaptive capacity. This strengths-based approach to recovery can include goal-setting and problem-solving, to help disasteraffected populations focus on the potential for longer-term objectives. The provision and facilitation of social support also become an important practical component of strength-based recovery, as does valuing and supporting both cultural and spiritual practices, and community diversity. Coordination and mediation appear invaluable, to facilitate constructive collaborations between recovery stakeholders, from the local to the regional scale. In the immediate term, it is important that over-arching monitoring and evaluation is resourced and put in place. This is necessary to address gaps in supports, new needs and whether the recovery effort is effective. This requires the establishment of both operational and strategic recovery management systems and practices. The Canterbury recovery process will be ongoing for some time. It has provided New Zealand with a challenge, but also with a chance to enhance all approaches to disaster recovery. The advisory group continues to engage with key agencies working to support the Canterbury recovery. Advisory group members are also involved in designing research projects dedicated to a better understanding of the Canterbury context. It is hoped this research can ultimately give insight into the consequences of the earthquake for individuals, family/whānau, communities and organisations, over varying time frames. Other research may analyse societal factors that influence community resilience to the immediate and longer term impacts of an earthquake. Implications of persistent aftershocks, infrastructure disruptions and temporary or permanent re-housing on resilience and adaptive capacity is another area that may receive research attention. Likewise, research may look at processes by which society transitions, recovers and adapts after the disruption caused by the earthquakes,

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and how these processes can be enhanced. It is not possible to clearly predict how consultation needs will change over time, and how processes will be affected by ongoing series of aftershocks or the financial aftermath. We are sure that academic engagement will continue to form an important part of the Canterbury recovery. The advisory group is honoured to be able to contribute to the re-development of this often remarkably resilient region. Appendix The Advisory Group was made up of the following individuals: Maureen F. Mooney: Research Officer, JCDR. She has spent the last ten years using her skills as a psychologist in psychosocial support response and the Humanitarian field including Haiti, Palestine, Pakistan, Colombia, the Asian and African continents. Her area of interest is resilience and coping of individuals and communities. Douglas Paton: Professor, School of Psychology, University of Tasmania. He has expertise in all-hazards risk communication, assessing and developing community resilience, and community recovery following natural disasters. Ian de Terte: Clinical Psychologist, School of Psychology, Massey University. He has clinical and research experience in the areas of disaster mental health, PTSD, occupational trauma, psychological resilience, and vicarious trauma. He is also completing a doctorate regarding the relationship between psychological resilience and occupational trauma. Sarb Joha: Associate Professor, Massey University, and Chair of the Psychosocial Recovery Advisory Group, JCDR. As a clinical and health psychologist, he has research and clinical interests in capability and capacity building for psychological support, before and after disaster events, as well as in disaster mental health. A. Nuray Karanci: Professor, Department of Psychology, Middle East Technical University, Turkey. She has extensive experience in post earthquake psychosocial dimensions and support,

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Psychosocial Recovery from Disasters: A Framework and has researched factors in preparedness for future hazard events. Dianne Gardner: Senior Lecturer, Industrial/Organisational Psychology, Massey University. She has research and practical expertise in psychological well-being at work, risk management as applied to occupational health and safety, organisational behaviour and occupational stress. Susan Collins: Research Officer, JCDR. Over the past 10 years, she has used her community psychology training to assist challenged communities with their revitalisation and recovery. Susan has been involved with rural communities which experienced flooding in the Bay of Plenty Region, and more recently in response to the Darfield Earthquake and the Queensland floods. Bruce Glavovic: EQC Chair in Natural Hazards Planning, Massey University, and JCDR Associate Director. His work has focussed on building sustainable communities by facilitating dialogue and collaboration between diverse and often contending interests. His research encompasses natural hazards planning, collaborative planning and consensus building amongst other relevant themes. Thomas J. Huggins: Administration Coordinator, Psychosocial Recovery Advisory Group, JCDR. He helps coordinate a range of complex Massey University initiatives, using innovative approaches to integrated project management. Lucy Johnston: Professor and Dean of Postgraduate Research, Canterbury University. She is on the management team of the New Zealand Institute of Language, Brain and Behaviour and oversees postgraduate study at the University of Canterbury. Her research interests have included social cognition, stereotyping and social perception. Ron Chambers: Clinical Psychology Professional Advisor & Consultant Clinical Psychologist, Anxiety Disorders Unit, Specialist Mental Health Services, Canterbury District Health Board. He has more than 15 years experience specialising in the treatment of anxiety disorders, and a range of mental health problems. He has provided related consultation, support and education to the wider Christchurch community.

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David Johnston: Professor, School of Psychology, Massey University and JCDR Director. His research has focused on reducing the vulnerability of society, the economy and infrastructure to hazard events.

(pp.115-130). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Dalton, J.H., Elias, M.J., & Wandersman, A. (2007) Community psychology: Linking individuals and communities. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.

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Jones, N., Roberts, P., & Greenberg, N. (2003). Peer-group risk assessment: A post-traumatic management strategy for hierarchical organisations. Occupational Medicine, 53, 469–475. Joseph, S., & Linley, P.A. (2005). Positive adjustment to threatening events: An organismic valuing. Review of General Psychology, 9(3), 262-280. Karasek, R., & Theorell, T. (1990). Healthy work: Stress, productivity and the reconstruction of working life. New York, NY: Basic Books. Kessler, R. C., Sonnega, A., Bromet, E., Hughes, M., & Nelson, C. B. (1995). Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the national comorbidity survey. Archives of General Psychiatry, 52(12), 10481060. Kornør, H., Winje, D., Ekeberg, Ø., Weisæth, L., Kirkehei, I., Johansen, K., & Steiro, A. (2008). Early traumafocused cognitive-behavioural therapy to prevent chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and related symptoms: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Biomed Central Psychiatry, 8(81). Lyons, R.F., Mickelson, K.D., Sullivan, M.J., & Coyne, J.C. (1998). Coping as a communal process. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 15(5), 579605. McCombs, H.G. (2010). The spiritual dimensions of caring for people affected by disasters. In P. DassBrailsford (Ed.) Crisis and disaster counseling: Lessons learned from hurricane Katrina and other disasters. (pp. 131-147). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. McNally, R.J., Bryant, R. A., & Ehlers, A. (2003). Does early psychological intervention promote recovery from posttraumatic stress? Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 4(2), 4579.

National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. (2005). Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): The management of PTSD in adults and children in primary and secondary care National cost-impact report. London, UK: Author. Norris, F. H., Stevens, S. P., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K. F., & Pfefferbaum, R. L. (2008). Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for disaster readiness. American Journal of Community Psychology, 41, 127-150. Palm, K.M., Polusny, M.A., & Follette, V.M. (2004). Vicarious traumatization: Potential hazards and interventions for disaster and trauma workers. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, 19(1), 73-78. Paton, D. (in press). Psychological rehabilitation planning for disaster survivors. Kaohsiung Journal of Medical Sciences. Paton, D. (2010). Adaptive capacity/resilience model: Summary of PGSF research. Wellington, NZ: Joint Centre for Disaster Research. Paton, D., & Jang, L. (2011). Disaster resilience: Exploring all-hazards and cross-cultural perspectives. In D. Miller & J. Rivera (Eds.), Community disaster recovery and resiliency: Exploring global opportunities and challenges. Oxford, UK: Taylor & Francis. Paton, D., & Johnston, D.M. (2001). Disasters and communities: Vulnerability, resilience and preparedness. Disaster Prevention and Management, 10(4), 270-277. Paton, D., & Johnston, D.M. (2006). Disaster resilience: An integrated approach. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas. Paton, D., Millar, M., & Johnston, D. (2001). Community resilience to

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volcanic hazard consequences. Natural Hazards, 24(2), 157-169. Paton, D., Smith, L., Daly, M., & Johnston, D. (2008). Risk perception and volcanic hazard mitigation: Individual and social perspectives. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 172, 179-188. Paton, D., & Tang, C.S. (2009). Adaptive and growth outcomes following tsunami: The experience of Thai communities following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In E. S. Askew, & J. P. Bromley (Eds.), Atlantic and Indian Oceans: New oceanographic research. New York, NY: Nova Science. Paton, D., Violanti, J.M., Johnston, P., Burke, K.J., Clarke, J, & Keenan, D. (2008). Stress shield: A model of police resiliency. International Journal of Emergency Mental Health, 10(2), 95107. Pfefferbaum, B.J., DeVoe, E.R., Stuber, J., Schiff, M., Klein, T.P., & Fairbrother, G. (2005). Psychological impact of terrorism on children and families in the United States. In Y. Danieli, D. Brom, & J. Sills (Eds.), The trauma of terrorism: Sharing knowledge and shared care, an international handbook (pp. 305-318). Philadelphia, PA: Haworth Press. Raphael, B., (1986). When disaster strikes: How individuals and committees cope with catastrophe. New York, NY: Basic Books. Saleebey, D., (1996). The strengths perspective in social work practice: Extensions and cautions. Social Work, 41(3), 296-305. Saint-Jacques, M., Turcotte, D. & Pouliot, E., (2009). Adopting a strengths perspective in social work practice with families in difficulty: From theory to practice. Families in Society, 90(4), 454-461. Shinn, M., & Toohey, S. M. (2003). Community contexts of human welfare. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 42759. Tedeschi, R.G., & Calhoun, L.G. (2004). Posttraumatic growth: Conceptual foundations and empirical evidence. Psychological Inquiry, 15(1), 1-18. Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110(3), 403-421.

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Psychosocial Recovery from Disasters: A Framework Tugade, M. M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). Resilient individuals use positive emotion to bounce back from negative emotional experiences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86(2), 320-333.

Author’s Note Corresponding author: David Johnston, Joint Centre for Disaster Research, Massey University, PO Box 756, Wellington 6140.

[email protected]. +64.4.8015799 ext 62168; +64.4.8014984.

Tel: Fax:

 Container train capturing ongoing rock falls, June 2011 — ©2011 Geoff Trotter

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The Communication of Uncertain Scientific Advice During Natural Hazard Events Emma E. H. Doyle, Massey University David M. Johnston, GNS Science, Lower Hutt, NZ John McClure, Victoria University of Wellington Douglas Paton, University of Tasmania

During natural hazard crises such as earthquakes, tsunami, and volcanic eruptions, a number of critical challenges arise in emergency management decision-making. A multidisciplinary approach bridging psychology and natural hazard sciences has the potential to enhance the quality of these decisions. Psychological research into the public understanding of different phrasings of probability has identified that the framing, directionality and probabilistic format can influence people’s understanding, affecting their action choices. We present results identifying that translations of verbal to numerical probability phrases differ between scientists and non-scientists, and that translation tables such as those used for the International Panel on Climate Change reports should be developed for natural hazards. In addition we present a preliminary result illustrating that individuals may ‘shift’ the likelihood of an event towards the end of a time window. New Zealand is a country at risk from numerous extreme natural hazards that pose a threat to life, infrastructure and business. These include explosive volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunami. Emergency management of these events involves a number of critical and challenging decisions often based on limited and uncertain information, incorporating an integration of the wide range of scientific opinions, model outputs, and outcome scenarios. The challenges inherent in this process were evident in the response and recovery management phases of the September 2010 and February 2011 Canterbury earthquakes. These complex issues can arise in the management of volcanic crises, which, during the lead up to a potential eruption and the management of the ensuing volcanic

crisis, present considerable uncertainty to emergency management decision makers. This paper includes an introduction to the ‘volcano problem’, followed by a review of emergency management in New Zealand, and of Exercise Ruaumoko, a simulation which tested the use of a scientific advisory group during the lead up to an imaginary eruption in Auckland. We then summarise the literature on the communication of verbal and numerical probabilities, with a discussion of the translation table approach that the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) adopts. Finally, we present some preliminary results of a survey to assess the differences between scientists’ and non-scientists’ translations of verbal probability phrases to numerical equivalents, and their perceptions of

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event likelihoods across time windows for multi-day statements. An Introduction to the Volcano Problem Prior to a volcanic eruption, many volcanoes exhibit precursory signals that indicate an eruption may occur. These can range from an increase in volcanic type earthquakes that may be felt by the local community or detected through sensitive seismometers, to changes in steam or other geothermal emissions from the volcano, and deformation of the volcano itself due to the inject of magma beneath the surface (see Johnston et al., 2002, for a review). However, these precursory signals are only hints that something may be happening. The lead up period to a volcanic eruption can range from hours (e.g., 19 hours at Rabaul, Papa New Guinea, see Blong & McKee, • 39 •

The Communication of Uncertain Scientific Advice During Natural Hazard Events

1995), to many months (e.g., 11 months at Mt Pinatubo, Philippines, see Newhall & Punongbayan, 1996b), and may not result in an eruption at all (e.g., Mammoth Mt/Long Valley Caldera, USA in 1980s, see Hill, 1998). In addition, when an eruption does occur there can be much uncertainty about the size of the eruption, and the type of impacts that may result. Thus, volcanic eruptions create an extremely uncertain environment for emergency management planning and the information and decision management required for effective response (Paton & Auld, 2006; Paton, Johnston, & Houghton, 1998), as critical decision makers balance the issue of life safety and community continuity through the crises. Added to the uncertainty implicit in managing the event itself, uncertainty emerges in relation to activities such as deciding on and advising of the need for evacuation in the context of concerns about making an “economically disastrous, unnecessary evacuation” (Tazieff, 1983, as cited in Woo, 2008, p. 88). From a volcanological view, the successful management and response to the lead up to an eruption is thus fundamentally dependent upon: (a) the geological knowledge, and the enhancement of this knowledge through the continued monitoring of the volcano (see reviews in Sparks, 2003; Tilling, 2008); (b) the communication between the scientific advisors and the emergency management community to guide their critical decisions both before (reduction, readiness), during (response), and after (recovery) a crisis (see review in Doyle & Johnston, 2011) ; and (c) the onward communication of this advice to the public through public education programmes and warnings (Leonard et al., 2008). The focus of the research reported in this paper is to explore the link between scientific advisory groups and the emergency management community, and how uncertainty impacts this communication. At steps b and c, it is also important to • 40 •

understand how agencies and community members interpret and use information and to accommodate the fact that the mental models of the latter can differ from each other and from the scientists producing the data. Thus, irrespective of the objective quality of the information made available by the scientific community, its ability to have the desired effect is influenced by how it is interpreted and filtered as it is transmitted to various recipients. A good example of the many layers of this interpretation is that represented by the multi-tiered nature of emergency management organisations, as explained in the next section. Emergency Management in New Zealand In New Zealand, civil defence and emergency management is coordinated through a three-tiered structure: national, regional, and local council/territorial authority (Lee, 2010). At the national level, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) promotes and manages policies and programmes for civil defence and emergency management (MCDEM, 2008a). During a national crisis, MCDEM will lead the response via the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC), which is a national level Emergency Operations Centre (EOC). An EOC such as this is a facility for central command and control, which when activated during a response is responsible for carrying out disaster management functions (see NZ Fire Services Commission, 1998). Through this process the response of multiple agencies is handled (fire, police protective agencies, Civil Defence, volunteers, etc). The NCMC liaises with and supports the 16 regional council CDEM groups across New Zealand, each of which operates their own Group EOC (GEOC) and in turn coordinates and supports EOCs at the local council level (Lee, 2010). There are a number of key strategic positions within an EOC, organised around the NZ Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS, NZ Fire Services Commission, 1998, p. 14). The four main components are:

Control: incident;

management

of

the

Planning and Intelligence: collection and analysis of incident information and planning of response activities; Operations: direction of an agency’s resources in combating the incident; and Logistics: provision of facilities, services and materials required to combat the incident. This CIMS structure enables personnel from different agencies, police, fire, and beyond, to work directly with their equivalent counterpart in another agency. The majority of the scientific and geological advice is thus directly communicated to the Planning and Intelligence desk, where it is utilised in the generation of situation reports and action plans. In addition, it is often also communicated directly to the Controller managing the incident, and through additional pathways to the wider CDEM community and the general public via bulletins, broadcasts and warnings (e.g., GeoNet daily volcanic bulletins during a crisis, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre alerts, and MetService severe weather forecasts). Crucial to realising the response benefits of CIMS training are exercises and simulations that can identify interpretation problems, allow their rectification and develop people’s capacities for decision making under stress (Paton & Flin, 1999), with developing capacity to understand and use science advice being a key goal of these exercises. Learning from exercises: The role of science advisors Communication problems have occurred in numerous volcanic hazard crises due to conflicting scientific advice either from internal and external agencies, or due to the presence of a wide range of scientific advisory bodies and individuals. Thus, experience from previous volcanic crises has led to the practice of communicating scientific advice from one source during a volcanic crisis (see review in Doyle & Johnston,

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2011, and the International Association for Chemistry and the Earth's Interior (IAVCEI) Subcomittee for Crisis Protocols, 1999). In NZ, this has been undertaken through the development of Scientific Advisory Groups (SAGs) established to bring the advice from various scientific agencies together. There are many different natural hazard Science Advisory Groups within NZ, including the Central Plateau Volcanic Advisory Group (CPVAG) to advise officials about the Central Volcanoes of the North Island, the Auckland Volcanic Scientific Advisory Group (AVSAG) to advise officials about the volcanic field under Auckland, and the Tsunami Expert Panel (TEP) which forms in response to a local, regional, or distant source earthquake. The process of the AVSAG advice provision was tested out from November 2007 to March 2008 through Exercise Ruaumoko, which was run as part of MCDEM’s National Exercise Programme. Through a representative governance group, MCDEM and the 16 regional council CDEM groups manage this ongoing national programme to encourage the practicing and continuous improvement of response planning, as well as the building of interagency relationships and processes (MCDEM, 2009). These exercises range from Tier 1 (Local Exercise run by an individual organisation) to Tier 4 (National Exercise including central government). Exercise Ruaumoko was a Tier 4 level exercise, and was run to test the local, regional, and national arrangements for dealing with the impact of a large natural hazard event on a major population centre (MCDEM, 2008b). Auckland was chosen as it sits on a ‘monogenetic’ basalt volcanic field (Auckland Volcanic Field, AVF), where individual eruptions can occur at different distributed volcanic vents, with more than 49 volcanic centres identified in the 360km field so far. The largest and youngest eruption occurred approximately 600 years ago, forming Rangitoto Island (see review in Lindsay et al., 2009). For the AVF, precursory lead times between detectable eruption precursors and an eruption at the surface can range from

months, to weeks, to less than a few days (see Blake, Wilson, Smith, & Leonard, 2006), or may not lead to an eruption at all as magma ‘stalls’ en route to the surface leading to what may be considered to be a ‘failed eruption’. As eruptions can occur anywhere within the AVF, and the location may not be known until magma is very close to the surface, emergency management decisions will be typified by a high degree of uncertainty due to the eruption timing, location, severity, hazards, impacts and consequences (Lindsay et al., 2009; MCDEM, 2008b). The scenario in Exercise Ruaumoko focused on the lead-up to a volcanic eruption in the Auckland metropolitan area, and the exercise was the first full test of the AVSAG advisory process (see reviews in MCDEM, 2008b; McDowell, 2008; Smith, 2009). This advisory group represented a wide range of expertise including members from universities, Crown Research Institutes, consultancies, and members of local and national CDEM groups. Advice was delivered during the ‘event’ through a tripartite sub-group system (Monitoring, Volcanology, and Social) all of which reported upwards to a smaller core SAG. This SAG then liaised directly with the NCMC and the Auckland Group EOC through teleconferences and two on-site liaison officers, who acted as a further information conduit between AVSAG, GeoNet (the monitoring arm of GNS Science), and the CDEM sector. A number of reviews were conducted after Exercise Ruaumoko, both at the National level (MCDEM, 2008b) and at the Auckland Regional Level (McDowell, 2008), identifying that the structure of science advice resulted in it being well delivered, clear, timely and very valuable. The use of on-site liaison officers was found to be very beneficial, enabling further translation and use of the expert advice by the emergency managers in the NCMC and the Auckland GEOC. A recommendation was the demonstrated importance of having scientific advice provided by “one trusted source” through AVSAG, as it helped to prevent conflicting or confusing messages (MCDEM,

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2008b). Suggested improvements included adjustments to the finer details of the advisory process and structure to encourage more integration between the different subgroups of the AVSAG, to prevent a disconnect between local and national advice provision to the Auckland GEOC and NCMC, and to ensure that the science advice and science research response, capability, and process, remain integrated (Cronin, 2008; MCDEM, 2008b; McDowell, 2008; Smith, 2009). We will not discuss these further here, except to say that the advisory group model is still undergoing development (Smith, 2009) and will no doubt evolve further to encompass lessons learnt from many recent hazard events and exercises in New Zealand (including the September 2010 Canterbury and February 2011 Christchurch earthquakes, the Pike River Mine disaster 2010, and the Tauranga oil spill 2011). Communicating Uncertainty and the Use of Probabilities Communicating from ‘one trusted source’ does not imply that the communication should be a consensus opinion, or that the communication does not include information about the associated uncertainty in the knowledge, data, or outcome, and thus it is important to identify how best to communicate these aspects. There is much discourse in the psychological literature as to whether revealing the uncertainties associated with a risk assessment will strengthen or decrease trust in a risk assessor and their message (see reviews in Miles & Frewer, 2003; Wiedemann, Borner, & Schultz, 2008). On the one hand, the communication of uncertainty has been suggested to enhance credibility and trustworthiness of the information provider. On the other, however, studies have suggested that it can decrease people’s trust and the credibility of the provider. It has also been suggested that the provision of uncertainty can allow people to justify inaction or their own agenda, or to perceive the risk as being higher or lower than it actually is depending on their personal attitudes.

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The Communication of Uncertain Scientific Advice During Natural Hazard Events

To address the many risks and uncertainties involved in volcanic eruptions, due to their complex nature, it has become increasingly popular for scientists to use probability statements in their communications. These probabilistic forecasts usually involve knowledge of both the dynamical phenomena and the uncertainties involved (Sparks, 2003). Recently, there has been a move to include predefined thresholds of probability based on a cost benefit analysis, prompted by a desire to make objective decisions via quantitative volcanic risk metrics (Lindsay et al., 2009; Woo, 2008). These cost-benefit analysis tools, and the use of forecasting systems such as Bayesian Event Trees for eruptions (Aspinall & Cooke, 1998; Marzocchi & Woo, 2007) are viewed as being highly advantageous for the decision-making process of the scientists, as it clarifies decision thresholds as well as optimising the decision-making time, as well as offering the hindsight ability to clearly explain how a decision was made (Lindsay et al., 2009). However, Haynes, Barclay, and Pidgeon (2008, p. 263) found at Montserrat Volcano Observatory, West Indies, that the use of probabilities “was considered to complicate communications as the likelihoods and associated uncertainties were neither wellexplained nor understood”. In addition, Cronin (2008) recognised, in a review of Exercise Ruaumoko, a need for the identification of protocols for communicating probabilities and uncertainties during volcanic crises to avoid misinterpretations during forecast communications. The IAVCEI Subcommittee For Crisis Protocols (1999, p. 330) recommend the use of “probabilities to calibrate qualitative assessments of risk”. Other volcanic crisis communication guidelines (e.g., McGuire, Solana, Kilburn, & Sanderson, 2009, p. 67) recommend that “qualitative, nontechnical statements yield more positive reactions among nonscientists”. In particular, these authors highlight that confusion can occur due to “a limited public understanding of … concepts such as probabilities in the forecasts”, and recommend that • 42 •

“percentages or proportions should be used carefully and sparingly and backed up by a more general statement” ( p. 68). An overview of lessons from the literature on communicating uncertainty In Exercise Ruaumoko a number of probabilistic statements were included in both the daily GeoNet volcanic bulletins, and the AVSAG communications, for example: ●

●

… “If magma ascent continuous [sic] at the present rate an eruption is likely in the next 2-3 days.” (Exercise Ruaumoko Science Alert Bulletin, AK-08/09, 11 March 2008)

… “Within this zone there is a 2550% probability of an eruption within the next 24 hours increasing to 75-90% within the next 48 hours.” … (Exercise Ruaumoko Science Alert Bulletin, AK-08/13, 12 March 2008) Looking at the first statement, an immediate question arises as to what “likely” actually means to the emergency managers. The emergency managers may interpret the likelihood quite differently to that intended by the scientists, and thus make disproportionate action choices. In the second statement, questions arise as to whether the numerical probabilities are interpreted by the emergency managers as high or low risk prompting either action, or inaction, and how this compares to the scientists’ understanding. Anecdotal discussions with participants after Exercise Ruaumoko raised the issue that the language with which the forecasts were communicated was being understood differently between the scientists and the emergency managers, whereby one would see 50% chance as being ‘low’ and another as it being ‘high’ and requiring immediate action. These questions require consideration both in the context of lessons learnt from the literature (discussed next), and through further direct investigations for the volcanic risk communication problem (discussed later).

Communicating verbal and numerical probabilities The communication of probabilistic statements has been studied extensively in the literature, and a number of lessons can be drawn from this for the communication of probabilistic forecasts during natural hazard events. These statements, whether they are in a numeric or linguistic format, can commonly be misinterpreted because their framing, directionality and probabilistic format can bias people’s understanding, thereby affecting their action choices (e.g., Budescu, Broomell, & Por, 2009; Honda & Yamagishi, 2006; Joslyn, Nadav-Greenberg, Taing, & Nichols, 2009; Karelitz & Budescu, 2004; Lipkus, 2010; Teigen & Brun, 1999). Verbal and linguistic probabilities include phrases such as unlikely, likely, certain, uncertain (see Risbey & Kandlikar, 2007; Teigen & Brun, 1999), with modifiers such as virtually, very, exceptionally, extremely (see Budescu et al., 2009; Dhami & Wallsten, 2005; Lipkus, 2010; Teigen & Brun, 1999). Experiments conducted by Brun and Teigen (1988) demonstrated that the term ‘likely’ can be translated to a numerical probability of p = 0.67 with a standard deviation of 0.16, and this mean value can change to 0.71 or 0.59 depending on the experimental context. Thus, one person may view ‘likely’ to represent a probability as low as 51% and another as high as 83% (see also Lipkus, 2010). In addition to the translation issue discussed above, Teigen and Brun (1999) identified that semantic issues can also cause miscommunications. These occur when the verbal phrases convey additional information beyond that which would be communicated via their numerical equivalents, as described by their directionality (Budescu, Karelitz, & Wallsten, 2003; Honda & Yamagishi, 2006; Joslyn & Nichols, 2009; Teigen & Brun, 1999), or the framing of the outcome (Kuhberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). The context and outcome severity of the occurrence has also been found to affect people’s likelihood perceptions. Studies have demonstrated that people can view a probability as being greater than it

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actually is if the severity of the outcome is high (e.g., Bruine De Bruin, Fischhoff, Millstein, & Halpern-Felsher, 2000; Patt & Dessai, 2005). Thus, people will interpret a ‘slight chance of cancer’ as being of greater likelihood than a ‘slight chance of a sprained ankle’ (Weber, 1994; Windschitl & Weber, 1999). Numerical, or frequentist, probabilistic statements have also been found to be subjected to the same affects (e.g., Bruine De Bruin et al., 2000; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Joslyn & Nichols, 2009). For example, Gigerenzer and Edwards (2003) state that there are three types of numerical representations that can cause confusion: single event probabilities, conditional probabilities, and relative risks. This confusion arises because it can be difficult to understand the class of events a probability or percentage is referring to. For example, a single event probability such as “a 30% chance of rain tomorrow” can cause misunderstanding as it does not specify the class of events and thus some could interpret this as 30% of the area, or 30% of the time, or 30% of days like tomorrow (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, Broek, Fasolo, & Katsikopoulos, 2005). Using translation tables to communicate probabilities Miscommunication of verbal probabilities between experts and nonexperts has been investigated in a number of fields, including medical practitioners and the general public (Brun & Teigen, 1988), as well as climate scientists and policy makers (Patt & Dessai, 2005). Patt and Dessai (2005) highlight the importance of considering your target audience when communicating an uncertainty, suggesting for example that the IPCC reports use a pluralistic approach with highly sophisticated parts of the report using a numeric format, and the more general chapters using verbal phrases and narratives. However, even though there is a variance in people’s numerical interpretation, verbal probability phrases are generally better understood than their numerical

counterparts (Patt & Schrag, 2003; Wallsten, Fillenbaum & Cox, 1986) and are thus still the preferred form of communication in many fields. In some fields, there has been a move to formalise the translation of verbal probability phrases. For example, since 2002 the IPCC reports have utilized qualitative descriptors for probability, as illustrated in Table 1.  Table 1: IPCC Qualitative Descriptors used for the Third Assessment Report Climate Change 2001, as given in Patt & Schrag (2003). Probability range 99%

Virtually certain

This process was initiated for the Third Assessment Report Climate Change 2001 (Houghton et al., 2002; herein referred to as IPCC3), in response to the recommendation of Moss and Schneider (2000) that the IPCC lead authors should communicate uncertainty via a sevenstep approach (see reviews in Patt & Schrag, 2003; Risbey & Kandlikar, 2007). However, as discussed by Karelitz and Budescu (2004, p. 26), a “drawback of standardised verbal scales is the difficulty of most people to suppress the meanings they normally associate with these terms”. Patt and Dessai (2005) caution that when defining probability words and phrases, one should explain that such a rigid framework does not necessarily match people’s intuitive use of the language, in the hope that this will prevent bias in conscientious readers. Budescu et al. (2009) have additionally found that the verbal probabilities in the 2007 IPCC report

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(herein referred to as IPCC4) may have implied higher levels of imprecision than are actually present. To address this, they recommend that an alternative form of communication should be used, where both verbal and numerical terms are used together, with the inclusion of a range for the numerical values where the range matches the uncertainty of the target events. A Survey on the Communication of Probabilities in Volcanic Crises As discussed above, during a volcanic crisis event or exercise, a multitude of verbal and numerical probabilistic statements can be produced on an almost daily basis. These statements often form the fundamental basis of the decisions made by emergency management personnel in their response to the crisis, and thus it is vital that the potential for miscommunication and misunderstanding is reduced as much as possible. Based on findings from the judgment literature research community, and the fact that scientists in volcanic crises are currently using deterministic, verbal, numerical, and time window predictive statements, there is a need now to identify differences in the scientists’ and civil authorities’ perceptions of the language used in these communications. To address this, we conducted three experiments via an online survey tool, to investigate: ●

The differences in translations between verbal and numerical probability phrases.

●

The perception of likelihood distributions within time windows.

●

The relationship between the perception of these distributions and action choice scenarios (in the manner of Joslyn et al., 2009).

Survey method The multi-part online survey tool featured both within- and betweensubject design and was administered

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through the Qualtrics Survey Research Suite software (Qualtrics Labs Inc., Provo, UT, USA, Version 2.03s, Copyright ©2011). This enabled the randomisation of questions within parts 1, 2 and 3, as well as the random allocation of participants to either Experiment Group A or B for parts 2 and 3. In part 2, each experiment group contained questions with either verbal or numerical phrases using the translations outlined by the IPCC3 (Table 1), while in part 3 each experiment group contained statements that utilised either the phrasing “in” or “within” to describe time windows, as these were used interchangeably during Exercise Ruaumoko. Participants were recruited from scientists in the natural hazard community of New Zealand (e.g., GNS Science, NIWA), from both physical and social scientists across NZ universities, and from civil authorities across the nation (e.g. MCDEM, CDEM, emergency and protective services, lifelines, etc.). In addition, the survey was delivered internationally to capture both the NZ and global perspectives, of importance due to the internationalisation of both the volcanological and emergency management sectors. Participants were directed to the online survey tool through a snowball approach via email contact with individuals in each organisation, and through advertisement in bulletins and on on-line notice boards, such as the MCDEM e-bulletin, the international ‘Volcano Listserv’ (run by Arizona State University), the bulletin board of the Comprehensive Emergency Management Research Network (CEMR), and in the Oceania newsletter of the International Association of Emergency Managers.

●

Local/regional government, civil defence, emergency management (Council, agency, etc);

●

Public safety, emergency services (police, fire, ambulance, rescue, response, etc);

●

Lifelines (infrastructure, water, telecommunications, electricity, transportation, gas, etc);

●

Other. From here on in this study we refer to category 1 as scientists, and categories 2 to 6 as non-scientists. This definition is based upon the multi-disciplinary nature of both the Scientific Advisory Groups (which incorporates geology, social science, economics), and the emergency management community (which incorporates lifeline management, CDEM, defence, fire, police, etc). Additional background questions included educational background, geographical region of residence, employer name, job role, and gender. In total, there were 179 participants who completed the survey, with 92 identifying as scientists, 85 as nonscientists, and 2 unidentified, and 47 choosing to identify their gender as women, 90 as men. We briefly report here on some initial results from part 1 of the survey tool, and an example question from part 2. Preliminary results: translating verbal to numerical terms The aim of part 1 of the survey

was to explore the translation of vague verbal probabilistic terms, such as the term ‘likely’ used in the example Ruaumoko statement discussed above. The terms ‘extremely unlikely’, ‘very unlikely’, ‘unlikely’, ‘medium likelihood’, ‘likely’, ‘very likely’, ‘virtually certain’ were all examined, to investigate how the translation of these terms compares to the guidelines outlined in the IPCC3 (Table 1). Initially, participants were shown each of these phrases in randomised, context free statements; these were then followed by four randomised context statements such as ‘At the current magma ascent rate, an eruption is likely’. All participants received the same statements, and following the methodology of Budescu et al. (2009), each participant was asked to rate on a numerical sliding bar scale ‘Your BEST estimate’ of the probability conveyed, as well as ‘THE LOWEST possible’ and ‘THE HIGHEST possible’ probabilities. Figure 1 shows the online display. We report below the preliminary results from the context free statements. Figure 1: A screen shot of the online survey format for part 1, which assessed participant’s translations from verbal to numerical probabilities using the verbal terms in the IPCC3 report (Table 1).

The survey was anonymous, and participants were asked to identify their primary employment sector, including specific options for: ●

Scientific or technical (agency, university or research institute);

●

Central/national government, civil defence, emergency Management (Ministry, agency, etc);

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Figure 2 illustrates the ‘BEST estimate’ translation for all participants, Figure 3 shows the translation for the group that identified themselves as scientists, and Figure 4 illustrates the translation for the group that identified themselves within the categories of non-scientists. Initial impressions from these figures is that the BEST estimates identified by the participants do not conform well with the IPCC3 guidelines at the extremes, and overall performance is worse for the more positive terms (> medium likelihood) with observable differences between scientists and non-scientists. The BEST estimates of medium likelihood are in a very narrow and extremely consistent range across both groups, suggesting that the category in the IPCC may be too wide. Following a method similar to that of Budescu et al. (2009), we identified whether the ‘LOWEST possible’ and ‘HIGHEST possible’ probabilities chosen by participants were consistent with the IPCC3 guidelines. We refer to these two chosen values as the ‘RANGE estimate’), which is deemed consistent if both the upper value and the lower value are within the range outlined in Table 1, and as inconsistent if they are outside the guideline range, and partially consistent otherwise. The same approach was also adopted for the ‘BEST estimate’, but using only the categories consistent and inconsistent.

Figure 2: The central 50% of numerical translations (boxes) of each verbal probability term, for all participants that took the survey. The solid lines within the box represent the median, and the whiskers represent 1.5 times the inter-quartile range above the first quartile and below the third. Circles indicate outliers, and stars indicate extremes. The horizontal

dashed lines represent the translation boundaries given in the IPCC3 report (Table 1), as also indicated by text in the figure. Figure 3: The central 50% of numerical translations (boxes) of each verbal probability term, for all participants that identified as scientists; key as for Figure 2

For the calculation of consistent, partially consistent, and inconsistent, we use the IPCC3 translation table given in Patt and & Schrag (2003). This differs from Budescu et al. (2009), who use the IPCC4 tables. We use the IPCC3 table because the probability ranges are bounded (e.g., unlikely corresponds to 1033%), whereas in the IPCC4 table the probability ranges are unbounded (e.g., unlikely corresponds to