Philosophy 653: Advanced Topics in Metaphysics Seminar Description: Spring, 2013 Alvin Goldman This seminar is mainly a course on meta-metaphysics, that is, the (proper) methodology of metaphysics. We will concentrate especially on the role of evidence from empirical science. Although it is fairly common nowadays to admit physics as a suitable source of evidence concerning (parts of) metaphysics, it is highly unorthodox (or simply ignored) to regard psychology or cognitive science as potential sources of evidence for metaphysics. This prospect, however, will be explored here. There is a body of empirical literature -- both in X-phi and in cognitive science -- exploring our intuitive thought about metaphysical topics, e.g., causation and free will. But this isn't metaphysics proper, which is concerned with reality itself rather than our concepts of reality, or our talk about reality. Focusing on "realist" metaphysics, then, rather than "conceptualist" metaphysics, is there any prospect of getting relevant evidence from psychology? (Not just evidence concerning the metaphysics of mind -- which everyone might admit -- but evidence about a broader range of metaphysical topics.) How could psychology be relevant? The prospect to be explored here is the idea that sciences of the mind might contribute to realist metaphysics by generating evidence that warrants revisionary or deflationary stances toward initially congenial metaphysical views. This will be explored vis-à-vis such topics as morals, God, time, necessity, essence, causation, color, events, and so forth. What kinds of psychological evidence could rationalize such revisionary moves, and how would this rationale proceed? Finally, are such potential revisionary moves epistemologically stable, or are they necessarily self-undermining?
