Ashima Goyal Session 3

Future of Indian Financial Liberalization Dr. Ashima Goyal Professor Opportunities for Global Partnership between India...

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Future of Indian Financial Liberalization Dr. Ashima Goyal Professor

Opportunities for Global Partnership between India and Japan -Infrastructure, the Environment, and Finance (Organized by ICRIER and JBIC in collaboration with JCIF) 13-14 September 2010, New Delhi

I n d i r a G a n d h i I n s t i t u t e o f D e v e l o p m e n t R e s e a r c h, M u m b a i

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Financial Reform: India’s choices ¾ Pre reform: Financial repression œ

Administered interest rates —

Controls; funds for Government

¾ Post reform:Liberalization Institutional and market development: Banks; BSE, NSE; demat œ Interest rates market determined: LAF; CCIL; RTGS; money markets œ

¾ Financial regulation œ

RBI; SEBI; IRDA; PFRDA; HLCCFM

¾ Current account convertibility Capital account: Gradual; order: equity over debt; long-term borrowing œ FDI, FPI, GDRs, ECBs, FIIs limits for G-secs œ

¾ Exchange rate: Double devaluation Market determined; managed but flexible; FX markets œ REER; two-way movement since 2003; FERA to FEMA œ

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Current Account

Capital Account

Reserves, inc-,dec+

12 .0 10 .0 8 .0 6 .0 4 .0 2 .0 0 .0 -2 .0 -4 .0 -6 .0 -8 .0 -10 .0 19 9 0 - 19 9 1- 19 9 2 - 19 9 3 - 19 9 4 - 19 9 5- 19 9 6 - 19 9 7- 19 9 8 - 19 9 9 - 2 0 2 0 0 191 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 0 0 0 -0 1 0 2

20 0203

20 0304

2 0 2 0 0 5- 2 0 2 0 0 70 4 -0 5 0 6 0 6 -0 7 0 8

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20 0 9 -10

20 0809

3

FDI

FPI

NRI deposits- inflow s

3 .0 2 .5 2 .0 1.5 1.0 0 .5 0 .0 -0 .5 -1.0 -1.5 19 9 0 - 19 9 1- 19 9 2 - 19 9 3 - 19 9 4 - 19 9 5- 19 9 6 - 19 9 7- 19 9 8 - 19 9 9 - 2 0 2 0 0 1- 2 0 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 0 0 0 -0 1 0 2 0203

20 2 0 2 0 0 5- 2 0 2 0 0 7- 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 -0 5 0 6 0 6 -0 7 0 8 0804 09

20 0 9 -10

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15,000

25000.00

10,000

20000.00

5,000

15000.00

D 0 10000.00 2006M4 2006M9 2007M2 2007M7 2007M12 2008M5 2008M10 2009M3 -5,000

BSE sensex

FPI (USD million)

FPI and BSE sensex

5000.00

-10,000

0.00 FPI(USD million)

BSE sensex

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Liberalization: Consequences ¾ Trend growth rose but so did volatility ¾ FDI stable Reduces supply-side bottlenecks; learning, better organization œ Smoothen process, reduce hurdles œ

¾ FPI: Volatile, drove equity market volatility œ

Risk sharing (inflows 3 times larger than outflows for equivalent market indices variation) Resumed soon: Indian growth prospects — Firms benefited easier fund access; also learning — But households exited equity markets —

¾ Reserves œ

Over US200b but CAD; self-insurance but cost

¾ Sovereign debt held internally œ

Large: 80 percent of GDP; limits on debt inflows; no Greece?

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Crises lessons ¾ Capital flows: Surges and sudden stops œ

Self-insurance, reserves —

Exchange rate flexibility; FX markets; hedging instruments

¾Foreign entry helps but alone does not deepen markets Example retail exit in equity markets œ New private banks but still large unbanked population œ

¾Transparent sequenced capital account convertibility Distinction between types of flows is useful and must be retained œ Korea: Reserves security led to high short-term debt, reserves proved inadequate œDomestic growth, financial deepening→ absorption, FDI ratio; real sector priority œ

¾ NIFA; G:20; regional arrangements: to allow faster liberalization? ¾ Structure of regulation œ

Global convergence; incentives

¾ Package: CAL, E and M policy, markets: middling through

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Future of Financial Liberalization: Critical development imperatives ¾ Inclusion ¾ Infrastructure financing Long-term: Bond markets: Retail, pension funds participation œ Rollover of ST financing; exit of investors; completing markets œ

¾Risk: Derivative markets OTC regulated in India but more transparency, CCP œ Standardized exchange traded instruments œ

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Banks ¾

Less than 50 percent of the population have bank accounts œ

¾

Expansion of banking services, not just credit

Use of technology; mobile banking; BCs; MSPs œMobile œ

¾

penetration high; last mile connectivity

Requirements: 100m migrants, remittances

Servicing large corporates (5-7% roi); MSEs (9-11.25%) œEntry;

mergers but competition, TBTF; loan consortium, LT ECBs

œCredit

bureaus, SARFAESI Act 2002 (used against MSEs)

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Markets ¾Equity markets Retail and institutional investor participation œ GDS/GDP crossed 30 %: large scope from domestic entry œ

—

œ

But share of household financial savings in equity dipped from 20% pre-reform to 5%

90% trading volume in top 10 cities, and in equity and commodities Only 1.5% of population invested in markets — Only 100 large cap stocks liquid — AMFs, ETFs, MSEs, single stock options, underperforming —

¾ Fixed income markets œ

Domestic deepening prior to free foreign entry —

œ

Banks to push G-secs retail? Allow SLR to fall; more trading

Corporate bond market Stamp duty; cost of issuing: private placement — Pension provident fund guidelines on the basis of rating not issuers category —

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Markets contd. ¾Debt markets contd. œInterest

rate futures

Attempts: 2003, 2009; ZCYC to YTM — Globally 81% of exchange traded derivatives, India 1% — Physical settlement — Corporate repo would provide users — Initially only two long-term deliverable G secs; lack of liquidity in underlying —

¾ FX markets OTC dominates, swaps œ BIS fastest growth rate among world markets but still thin; if no intervention spikes œ Futures, rapid growth œ

Low Open Interest — Not settled in hard currency — Low contract size: USD 1000 —

œ

Continuous devt.: Multiple currencies, options

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¾ Creation of electronic markets: Exceeding

international standards œ

Disclosure: real time price sensitive info; norms; corporate governance; legal issues; shareholder rights

œ

Volatility: Var + SPAN+ margins +deposits+ circuit breakers +surveillance —

œ

No stock exchange failed

Competition: liquidity → network → tipping

BSE → NSE — Entry: MCX, NSE → predatory pricing? platforms, lock-in —

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Asian integration ¾ Regional financial integration low œ Although intraregional trade more than 50% of total trade œCollapse of trade in 2008 partly due to credit freeze œAlternatives to Western markets, currencies and institutions; more stable; AMF ¾ ABMI œ Large Asian savings to fund Asian infrastructure; stable long-term finance œ Regional clearing and settlement systems ¾ CMI œ Supporting institutions; expansion; review; prevent competitive devaluations ¾ CSR œ Environment œ Commitment to regional development ¾ Incentives from high expected Asian growth and trade expansion

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Post Crisis: Market and Regulatory Failures ¾ Market efficiency implies (no failures): œ

Market prices give economic value

œ

Market discipline constrains harmful risk taking

œ

Market competition weeds out unproductive innovations —

Securitised credit: liquidity, diversification

—

Mathematical models: robust measures of trading risk

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¾ Market failure œ

Monopoly or market power

œ

Asymmetric or imperfect information

œ

Externalities or public goods

¾ Financial system: Oversight of operational framework œ

Externality—excess volatility: one → others, financial → real

œ

Information— asymmetric; adverse selection, moral hazard

œ

Monopoly— network effects; TBTF → risk taking

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Government

Markets

Regulation: Principle-based rules Change incentives of agents Regional standardization, operational freedom

Basic market failures ¾ Broad justification for regulation œ

Pendulum: neither self-regulation nor regulatory forbearance

œ

Use incentives not controls: So don’t damp energy and freedom of markets

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Future Financial Reform: Stability ¾ Indian markets → Global norms → Indian regulations œ œ

Micro-prudential regulation → securitization retention; PCA Macro-prudential regulation → procyclical capital adequacy Reduce under pricing of risk in booms — Reduce S-T Funding; excess leverage —Size (TBTF) → insurance premium — Imposed by host country (domestic cycles) —

¾

Universal standards ⇒ ↓ regulatory arbitrage; ↓ Competitive risk-taking

¾Would allow faster liberalization

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Indian regulation ¾ Crisis—financial sector healthy No road, or good regulation? œ Eye on market failures, steady market development but innovation slow œ

¾ Supervision œ œ

Post liberalization crises → strengthened Conglomerates → universal regulation

¾ Counter cyclical incentives - prescient Provisioning œ Accounting standards—unrealized gains and losses asymmetric œ PCA œ

¾ Low cost of Basel III compliance œ œ

Banks tier I capital to risk weighted assets 9.3 already Credit GDP to rise structurally; cost of OTC derivatives to rise; SLR not a liquidity buffer?

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¾Financial stability œ

Synergy between monetary policy and regulatory responsibilities

œ

LOLR required by many non-bank entities also

¾FSDC

should be improved HLCCFM

œImproved œChair

coordination most important; lacking in govt. agencies

macroprudential regulator with hands on knowledge

Delays: Corporate Repo Market: CCIL; ownership — Functional regulation: overlap inevitable; clear responsibility allocation —

œLegal —

structure; development mandated

Timelines

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