1 Knowledge and Assertion Syllabus Spring 2012 Rodrigo Borges
[email protected]
1. Description This 300-level upper-division undergraduate course, intended primarily for philosophy majors, will cover the literature on a fascinating question that has recently surfaced at the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of language: whether knowledge is the “norm of assertion.” We do many things with words, and our language is governed by certain rules or “oughts” that enable us to be both e cient and creative in communication. Some of these rules hold because in using language in certain ways, we end up representing ourselves in corresponding ways: for example, as sincere, or knowledgeable, or ignorant. And in some cases we can misrepresent ourselves and/or mislead our hearers. What explains all this? This course will hold special appeal for undergraduates with cross-disciplinary interests in language, epistemology, and communal/social normativity, and will provide a rich background for those interested in further study in philosophy or linguistics. 2. Prerequisites and Learning Outcome Goals Phil 103 or 104: Intro to Philosophy. Recommended: Phil 220 Theory of Knowledge and/or Phil 210 Intro to Philosophy of Language. This course satisfies Area 5 requirements for the Philosophy Major. Upon completion, students in this course will have (i) analyzed theoretical issues concerning the role of knowledge in everyday English language use, and (ii) applied them to practical scenarios both real and hypothetical, gaining a better understanding of how variable epistemic conditions affect assertability conditions. Realizing such goals promotes a fuller appreciation of the value of knowledge to social interaction and as an aid to human action. 3. Requirements a. Class Attendance: students are expected to attend all classes. If you expect to miss one or two classes, please use the University absence reporting website https://sims.rutgers.edu/ssra/ to indicate the date and reason for your absence. An email is automatically sent to me. Here is my policy for missed classes. If you miss a class and you do not fulfill either condition I or both conditions II and III you will be penalized (i.e., you will lose 25 points from your final grade): I – This is the first time you miss a class without an acceptable excuse; II - You have an acceptable excuse, such as illness or a religious holiday or an University sponsored event; III – You discuss your absence with me immediately after the first class meeting that you return. b. Three essays will be due during the term, on topics assigned from the readings: the first paper will be 5–6 pages, the second will be 8 pages, and the final paper, which may involve some research beyond the required readings, is to be 10–12 pages. c. Final grades will be based primarily on this written work. There will be no mid-term or final exams.
4. Final Grade Class participation: 25 bonus points (This will be based on your own class participation in the discussions.) Attendance: -25 points for each unexcused absence (Everybody has one “free”one.) 1st paper (5-6 pages): 100 points 2nd paper (8 pages): 200 points 3rd paper (10-12): 400 points There is a total of 700 points (not including the bonus ones.) The final grade will be based on your total points as follows: A ≥
624
B+ = 589 - 623 B =
554 - 588
C+ = 519 - 553 C =
484 - 518
D = 414 - 483 F ≤
413
Using a 100 point scale, the grade equivalences would be: A ≥
90
B+ = 85 - 89 B =
80 - 84
C+ = 75 - 79 C =
70 - 74
D = 60 - 69 F ≤
59
5. Plagiarism Plagiarism is ugly and the student who plagiarizes will be punished in accordance with University regulation. Please, refer to this website for Rutger's Academic Integrity Policy: http://academicintegrity.rutgers.edu/integrity.shtml. In light of that, any direct (i.e., same words) or indirect (i.e., same ideas) reference to someone else's work has to be acknowledged in all written or spoken presentations. 6. Course Material All the course material will be made available on the sakai site for the course. However, I strongly recommend the purchase of two books from which a good portion of the readings for the course come from: Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits. (Oxford Univ Press, 2000). Patrick Greenough’s (ed.) and Duncan Pritchard’s (ed.) Williamson on Knowledge (Oxford Univ Press, 2009).
3 7. Disabilities If you have a learning disability, please see me and we will make the necessary arrangements. 8. Office Hours I strongly encourage you to come to my office to discuss anything related to the course. I will hold office hours at 1 Seminary Place, room 14. To set up an appointment, please email me at:
[email protected].
9. Schedule of Assignments (subject to change) Date
Background
Assignment
1/17
Introduction to the course
1/20
a. Max Black: ‘Saying and Disbelieving’ b. Paul Grice: ‘Logic and Conversation’ c. G.E. Moore: ‘Moore’s Paradox’ d. John MacFarlane: ‘What is Assertion?’
1/24 1/27 1/31 2/3
a. Ch. 7 of Peter Unger’s Ignorance b. Michael Slote: ‘Assertion and Belief.’
2/7 2/10 The Knowledge Account
2/14 2/17 2/21 2/24 2/28 3/2 3/6 3/9
Objections and Rivals
Ch. 11 of Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits
3/13 3/16
Keith DeRose: ‘Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries.’ a. Sanford Goldberg’s ‘The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Nature of Testimonial Knowledge’, b. Williamson’s reply. First Paper is Due! Matthew Weiner’s ‘Must We Know What We Say?’ Jennifer Lackey’s “Norms of Assertion.” SPRING BREAK - reading during the week: Weiner, Lackey and Stanley
3/20
Jason Stanley (2008) “Knowledge and Certainty.”
3/23
Ishani Maitra: "Assertion, Norms, and Games"
3/27
Maitra and Weatherson: ‘Assertion, knowledge, and action’
3/30 4/3 Advances and Extensions
4/6
John Turri: ‘The express knowledge account of assertion’ John Turri: “Prompting Challenges” Second Paper is Due!
4/10
John Turri: ‘Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism’
4/13
David Sosa: ‘Dubious assertions’
4/17
Matthew Benton: ‘Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions’
4/20
Matthew Benton: ‘Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion’
4/24
Martijn Blaauw: ‘Reinforcing the Knowledge Account of Assertion’
4/27
Back up date
5/3
Final Paper is Due!
5
10. Bibliography Benton, M.A (2011) ‘Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions’ in Philosophical Studies. Benton, M.A. (forthcoming) ‘Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion’ in Analysis. Benton, M.A. (forthcoming a) ‘Assertion, Knowledge, and Predictions’ in Analysis. Blaauw, Martijn (forthcoming) ‘Reinforcing the Knowledge Account of Assertion’. Black, Max (1951) “Saying and Disbelieving.” Repr. in his Problems of Analysis. Cornell University Press. DeRose, Keith (1996) “Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 568–580. DeRose, Keith (2002) “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context” in Philosophical Review 111: 167–203. Goldberg, Sanford (2009), “The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Nature of Testimonial Knowledge,” in Williamson on Knowledge: pp. 60–72. Greenough, Patrick (ed.) and Pritchard, Duncan (ed.) Williamson on Knowledge (Oxford Univ Press, 2009). Grice, Paul (1989 [1967]) “Logic and Conversation” in his Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press. Kvanvig, Jonathan (2009), “Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries,” in Williamson on Knowledge, pp. 140–60 Lackey, Jennifer (2007) “Norms of Assertion.” in Noˆus 41: 594–626. Moore, G. E. (1993). "Moore's Paradox". in Baldwin, Thomas. G. E. Moore: Selected Writings. London: Routledge. pp. 207–212. Slote, Michael (1979 [2010]) “Assertion and Belief.” Repr. in his Selected Essays. Oxford University Press. Sosa, D. (2009). ‘Dubious assertions’, in Philosophical Studies, 146, 269–272. Stanley, Jason (2008) “Knowledge and Certainty” in Philosophical Issues 18: 33–55. Turri, John (2010) “Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism” in Philosophical Review 119: 77–95. Turri, John (forthcoming) “The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Turri, John (2010) “Prompting Challenges” in Analysis 70: 456–462. Unger, Peter (1975) Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism, Oxford University Press. Weiner, Matthew (2005) “Must We Know What We Say?” in Philosophical Review 114: 227–251.
Williamson, Timothy (2000) Knowledge and its Limits. (Oxford Uni. Press).
